T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
- scripts/submit_gpt_image_2.sh:4
- Finding
- PoYo API Key Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/submit_gpt_image_2.sh`, lines 4–7 **Vulnerability Type**: API credential exposure through process arguments **Risk Level**: Medium ```sh api_key="${POYO_API_KEY:-${1:-}}" if [ -z "$api_key" ]; then echo "Usage: submit_gpt_image_2.sh [api_key] [payload.json]" >&2 echo "Or set POYO_API_KEY and pass [payload.json]. If no payload file is given, JSON is read from stdin." >&2 ``` ### Technical Analysis The script accepts the PoYo bearer API key as its first positional command-line argument when `POYO_API_KEY` is not set. Secrets passed through command-line arguments can be exposed through shell history, process inspection facilities, execution telemetry, audit logs, or process-monitoring software. Although the script also supports the safer environment-variable mechanism, its usage message explicitly advertises passing the key as an argument. This can encourage users or automated systems to invoke the script insecurely. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the script using the documented positional argument, such as `submit_gpt_image_2.sh API_KEY payload.json`. 2. The bearer key is placed in the shell command line and process argument vector. 3. The command may be retained in shell history, endpoint telemetry, audit records, or process-monitoring output. A sufficiently privileged local observer may also inspect it while the command is running. 4. An attacker with access to one of these local data sources retrieves the key. 5. The attacker submits requests directly to the PoYo API using the stolen bearer credential. This path requires access to local process information, command history, telemetry, or related logs; the project does not itself transmit the key to an undeclared endpoint. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation compromises the PoYo API key. The attacker can exercise the API permissions associated with that credential, including subm ...[truncated 244 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Remove support for supplying the API key as a positional command-line argument. - Require `POYO_API_KEY` or an equivalent secret-management mechanism and update the usage message so it no longer advertises command-line key entry. - Where environment variables are unsuitable, read the key silently from a terminal or dedicated file descriptor without echoing it or placing it in the argument vector. - Use a secrets manager or narrowly scoped credential injection mechanism in automated environments. - Ensure logs and error messages never print the credential. - Rotate any API key that may previously have been entered on a command line, and remove affected shell-history or telemetry records where feasible. - Limit the API key's permissions, quota, and lifetime to reduce the consequences of future disclosure.