T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/submit_flux_2.sh:4- Finding
PoYo API Key and Request Payload Exposed Through Process Arguments
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/submit_flux_2.sh, lines 4-21
Vulnerability Type: API credential and sensitive request-data exposure through command-line arguments
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
sh api_key="${POYO_API_KEY:-${1:-}}" if [ -z "$api_key" ]; then echo "Usage: submit_flux_2.sh [api_key] [payload.json]" >&2 echo "Or set POYO_API_KEY and pass [payload.json]. If no payload file is given, JSON is read from stdin." >&2 exit 1 fi payload="${2:-${1:+}}" if [ -n "${POYO_API_KEY:-}" ]; then payload="${1:-}" fi if [ -n "$payload" ] && [ "$payload" != "$api_key" ]; then body=$(cat "$payload") else body=$(cat) fi curl -sS https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit -H "Authorization: Bearer $api_key" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$body"Technical Analysis
The script accepts
POYO_API_KEYas a positional command-line argument and interpolates the resulting secret into thecurlauthorization-header argument. It also loads the complete JSON request into a shell variable and passes it through the-d "$body"command-line argument.Process arguments can be exposed through operating-system process inspection, process accounting, diagnostic or monitoring software, and execution logs, subject to the host's process visibility controls. Supplying the API key as a positional argument creates an additional disclosure channel because the original invocation may be retained in shell history.
The JSON body may contain private prompts, callback URLs, and source-image URLs. Consequently, the vulnerable invocation can expose both authentication material and user request data.
Attack Path
- A user runs the helper with the PoYo API key as its first positional argument, for example,
submit_flux_2.sh API_KEY payload.json, or runs it withPOYO_API_KEYset. - The script starts
curlwith the bearer token embedded in the authorization ...[truncated 1171 chars]
- A user runs the helper with the PoYo API key as its first positional argument, for example,
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Remove support for supplying the API key as a positional argument. Require
POYO_API_KEYfrom a controlled environment or read the credential from a permission-restricted secret file or secret manager. -
Do not place the JSON body directly in the
curlargument vector. Stream it through standard input using--data-binary @-, for example:sh if [ -n "$payload" ]; then curl -sS https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $POYO_API_KEY" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data-binary @- < "$payload" else curl -sS https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $POYO_API_KEY" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data-binary @- fi -
Where local process visibility is a concern, avoid placing the authorization header in the process argument vector as well. Use a permission-restricted temporary curl configuration or an API client that constructs headers internally. Ensure any credential file is created with mode
0600, is not stored in a shared directory, and is securely removed after use. -
Document that secrets must not be entered directly on the shell command line and advise users to remove any previously exposed keys from shell history.
-
Rotate any API key that may already have been supplied positionally or captured by process monitoring.
-
Apply least privilege, quotas, and usage alerts to PoYo credentials to constrain the effect of future disclosure.
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