T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/submit_claude_4_5_messages.sh:12- Finding
PoYo API Key Exposed Through Process Command-Line Arguments
- Content
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/cmdline`, process-monitoring software, audit agents, or diagnostic collection tools. The exact visibility of command-line arguments depends on operating-system configuration and user boundaries. On systems where other local users, administrators, monitoring services, or processes in the same security context can inspect the command line, they may recover the credential. Sending the API key and caller-provided message payload to `https://api.poyo.ai/v1/messages` is otherwise consistent with the Skill's declared functionality. The issue is the local handling of the credential, not the documented transmission to PoYo over HTTPS. ### Attack Path 1. A user exports a valid `POYO_API_KEY` and invokes the submission script with a JSON payload. 2. The shell expands `${POYO_API_KEY}` into the `curl` command-line arguments. 3. During the network request, a local observer or monitoring component reads the `curl` process command line. 4. The observer extracts the value following the `x-api-key` header. 5. The observer submits unauthorized requests to the PoYo API using the stolen credential. Exploitation requires sufficient local process-inspection access while the `curl` process is active, or access to monitoring or audit records t ...[truncated 627 chars]- Remediation
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