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Security audit

Coinw Spot Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent CoinW trading skill, but it handles crypto credentials and account-changing actions with several under-scoped safety controls.

Review this carefully before installing. Use a least-privilege CoinW API key, avoid enabling withdrawals unless absolutely required, use IP allowlisting, do not paste secrets into chat, and do not share full commands or logs unless credentials and signatures are redacted. Require explicit confirmation before orders, cancellations, and transfers.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
Readme.md:30
Finding

Unpinned Remote Package Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:100
Finding

API Authentication Material Is Exposed in URL and Process Arguments

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (11)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Readme.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

md
## Authentication

For CoinW Skills, certain endpoints require you to provide CoinW API credentials. You can do this by setting environment variables, using a secrets file (such as `.env` or `.openclaw/secrets.env`), or sending them directly to the agent in the chat.

For more details, see the Security section in each skill.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The authentication guidance explicitly says users may send CoinW API credentials directly to the agent in chat, without a strong warning that chat content may be logged, retained, exposed to tools, or mishandled by downstream systems. In an agent skill for crypto trading, this is especially dangerous because leaked API keys can enable account access, trading abuse, withdrawals or transfers depending on key scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to run npx skills add https://github.com/connectCoinw/coinw-skills without pinning a specific version, commit, or release. This creates a supply-chain risk because users may fetch changed or compromised code in the future, and in a skills marketplace context that code can influence agent behavior and access sensitive credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill enables asset transfers and other account-impacting financial actions but only explicitly requires confirmation for trade actions, not transfers. In a finance context, moving funds between accounts can have real monetary consequences, so the lack of an explicit transfer-specific warning and confirmation step increases the risk of accidental or unauthorized fund movement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

md
### Auth and URL
- Base URL: `https://api.coinw.com`.
- Public REST: `GET/POST https://api.coinw.com/api/v1/public?command=...`.
- Private REST: usually `POST https://api.coinw.com/api/v1/private?command=...`, with `api_key` and `sign` (MD5, see Reference) in query/body.
- Some docs show `/v1/private?command=...` alongside `/api/v1/private`; follow actual implementation.
### `command` values (private/public endpoints covered in this file)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 96)May include surrounding context.

md
### Auth and URL
- Base URL: `https://api.coinw.com`.
- Public REST: `GET/POST https://api.coinw.com/api/v1/public?command=...`.
- Private REST: usually `POST https://api.coinw.com/api/v1/private?command=...`, with `api_key` and `sign` (MD5, see Reference) in query/body.
- Some docs show `/v1/private?command=...` alongside `/api/v1/private`; follow actual implementation.
### `command` values (private/public endpoints covered in this file)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

This section documents private REST calls that transmit api_key and sign to an external service, which is necessary for operation but still security-sensitive because it authorizes account access and financial actions. In addition, the text says credentials may be provided 'in chat,' which increases exposure risk if users paste secrets into conversational logs rather than using a secure credential flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

md
### Auth and URL
- Base URL: `https://api.coinw.com`.
- Public REST: `GET/POST https://api.coinw.com/api/v1/public?command=...`.
- Private REST: usually `POST https://api.coinw.com/api/v1/private?command=...`, with `api_key` and `sign` (MD5, see Reference) in query/body.
- Some docs show `/v1/private?command=...` alongside `/api/v1/private`; follow actual implementation.
### `command` values (private/public endpoints covered in this file)
`cancelAllOrder`, `cancelOrder`, `doTrade`, `getBatchHistoryOrders`, `getUserTrades`, `return24hVolume`, `returnBalances`, `returnChartData`, `returnCompleteBalances`, `returnOpenOrders`, `returnOrderBook`, `returnOrderStatus`, `returnOrderTrades`, `returnSymbol`, `returnTicker`, `returnTradeHistory`, `returnUTradeHistory`, `spotWealthTransfer`

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The example constructs an authenticated trading request by embedding api_key and sign directly into the request URL query string. Putting sensitive authentication material in URLs is dangerous because URLs are commonly logged by clients, proxies, gateways, shell history, and observability systems, which can leak credentials or reusable signed requests in a financial context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

params="api_key=$COINW_API_KEY&amount=0.001&funds=1&isMarket=1&out_trade_no=1&rate=40000&symbol=BTC_USDT" sign_string="$params&secret_key=$COINW_SECRET_KEY" sign=$(echo -n "$sign_string" | openssl md5 | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]') curl -X POST "https://api.coinw.com/api/v1/private?command=doTrade&$params&sign=$sign"

text
## Security
When showing credentials to users:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The document instructs users how to enable elevated API permissions such as trading and withdrawal, but it does not clearly warn about the security consequences of granting those capabilities. In the context of an agent skill that may be used to automate exchange actions, omission of permission-minimization guidance increases the risk that users create overprivileged keys which could be abused to place trades or move funds if the key is exposed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The support escalation template asks users to provide complete request commands, full API responses, timestamps, IPs, and logs, but it does not warn them to redact API keys, secrets, signatures, auth headers, cookies, or other sensitive identifiers first. In an API skill handling trading and account operations, this can lead to credential leakage or disclosure of account metadata to support channels, logs, or ticketing systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The sample response contains a Chinese-language message literal ("用户api出错") in an otherwise English document, with no translation or note about locale. This creates a language-policy inconsistency because the skill content effectively presents a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.