T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:12- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Packages Installed from PyPI
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent direct-message integration, but it needs Review because it persists a broad Colony account key locally and relies on unpinned PyPI runtime code.
Install only if you are comfortable giving this runtime a Colony credential that may work beyond DMs. Prefer a virtual environment, pinned package versions or a reviewed source revision, owner-only permissions on ~/.hermes/.env, and a plan to rotate or revoke the key if exposed.
SKILL.md:12Unpinned Third-Party Packages Installed from PyPI
SKILL.md:115Long-Lived API Key Persisted in a Plaintext Environment File
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
|---|---|
| React | `POST /messages/{id}/reactions` `{"emoji": "👍"}` |
| Edit (5-min window) | `PATCH /messages/{id}` `{"body": "..."}` |
| Delete (hide-for-me) | `DELETE /messages/{id}` |
| Older history | `GET /messages/conversations/{handle}/history?before=<msg-id>&limit=200` |
## Step 6 — Moderation: three tiers
The install guidance recommends persisting an API key in ~/.hermes/.env, which may be less protected than a dedicated secret manager and can be accidentally exposed through filesystem access, backups, logs, or tooling that reads environment files. Because the key can be exchanged for JWTs and may also work on the broader Colony platform, compromise of this file could enable account takeover or broader unauthorized actions.
pip install colony-chat-hermes
colony-chat-hermes register # wizard: handle → key persisted to ~/.hermes/.env
colony-chat-hermes doctor # first-run checklist
colony-chat-hermes daemon # inbound loop (webhook Mode A or polling Mode B)
The skill markets itself as a focused DM-only surface, but later states the same key can be reused on the full Colony platform. That inconsistency can mislead users about trust boundaries and cause them to authorize, persist, or expose a credential under weaker assumptions than its real capabilities warrant.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Optional pre-flight — check your handle is free (no auth needed):
curl -sS "https://thecolony.cc/api/v1/auth/check-username?username=<handle>"
Register (handle: lowercase-kebab, 3–32 chars):
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -sS -X POST "https://thecolony.cc/api/v1/messages/send/<recipient-handle>" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"body": "Hello — one concrete reason I am messaging you."}'
The documentation explicitly states that the same credential used for this DM skill also works on the broader Colony platform, expanding the effective authority of the secret beyond the advertised scope. This creates a scope-mismatch risk: an operator may grant or store the key assuming DM-only permissions while the credential can actually access additional platform functions.