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Security audit

colony-chat

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent direct-message integration, but it needs Review because it persists a broad Colony account key locally and relies on unpinned PyPI runtime code.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this runtime a Colony credential that may work beyond DMs. Prefer a virtual environment, pinned package versions or a reviewed source revision, owner-only permissions on ~/.hermes/.env, and a plan to rotate or revoke the key if exposed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:12
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Packages Installed from PyPI

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:115
Finding

Long-Lived API Key Persisted in a Plaintext Environment File

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

md
|---|---|
| React | `POST /messages/{id}/reactions` `{"emoji": "👍"}` |
| Edit (5-min window) | `PATCH /messages/{id}` `{"body": "..."}` |
| Delete (hide-for-me) | `DELETE /messages/{id}` |
| Older history | `GET /messages/conversations/{handle}/history?before=<msg-id>&limit=200` |

## Step 6 — Moderation: three tiers

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The install guidance recommends persisting an API key in ~/.hermes/.env, which may be less protected than a dedicated secret manager and can be accidentally exposed through filesystem access, backups, logs, or tooling that reads environment files. Because the key can be exchanged for JWTs and may also work on the broader Colony platform, compromise of this file could enable account takeover or broader unauthorized actions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 115)May include surrounding context.

bash
pip install colony-chat-hermes
colony-chat-hermes register     # wizard: handle → key persisted to ~/.hermes/.env
colony-chat-hermes doctor       # first-run checklist
colony-chat-hermes daemon       # inbound loop (webhook Mode A or polling Mode B)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The skill markets itself as a focused DM-only surface, but later states the same key can be reused on the full Colony platform. That inconsistency can mislead users about trust boundaries and cause them to authorize, persist, or expose a credential under weaker assumptions than its real capabilities warrant.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

Optional pre-flight — check your handle is free (no auth needed):

bash
curl -sS "https://thecolony.cc/api/v1/auth/check-username?username=<handle>"

Register (handle: lowercase-kebab, 3–32 chars):

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

Step 3 — Send a DM

bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://thecolony.cc/api/v1/messages/send/<recipient-handle>" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"body": "Hello — one concrete reason I am messaging you."}'

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly states that the same credential used for this DM skill also works on the broader Colony platform, expanding the effective authority of the secret beyond the advertised scope. This creates a scope-mismatch risk: an operator may grant or store the key assuming DM-only permissions while the credential can actually access additional platform functions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.