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Security audit

Tarkov API + Wiki Hardcore Assistant

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Tarkov data lookup helper with bounded default endpoints and no evidence of hidden persistence, credential use, or destructive behavior.

Install only if you want an agent to make live Tarkov.dev and EFT Wiki requests and, when asked, read a stash JSON or CSV file you provide. Avoid using --allow-unsafe-endpoint unless you intentionally trust the alternate endpoint, and prefer the preset commands over raw queries for routine lookups.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (15)

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-model.md (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

md
- Oversized queries causing slowdowns/timeouts
- Blind trust in unvalidated external data
- Unsafe shell interpolation from user/API data
- Excessive raw-query usage without constraints
- Overconfidence in projected profit/risk models (flip and risk scores are heuristics)
- Treating community wiki edits as authoritative without cross-check

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-model.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
## Built-in controls in `scripts/tarkov_api.py`

1. **Endpoint allowlist by default**
   - Refuses non-`api.tarkov.dev` GraphQL endpoint unless `--allow-unsafe-endpoint` is explicitly set.
   - Refuses non-official EFT wiki API endpoint unless explicitly overridden.

2. **Limit clamping**

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The allow_unsafe flag disables endpoint restrictions entirely, letting a caller redirect requests to arbitrary URLs. In an agent environment this can be abused for SSRF-like behavior, sending queries and metadata to attacker-controlled hosts, probing internal services, or bypassing the skill’s declared trust boundary.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tarkov_api.py (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

python
return endpoint
    if not endpoint.startswith(SAFE_ENDPOINT_PREFIXES):
        die(
            "Refusing unsafe endpoint. Use --allow-unsafe-endpoint only for trusted local testing."
        )
    return endpoint

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The wiki endpoint safety check can also be fully bypassed with the same unsafe flag, allowing arbitrary GET requests to untrusted URLs. This broadens the attack surface beyond the intended EFT wiki and enables misuse as a generic network client in contexts where agent inputs may be attacker-influenced.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tarkov_api.py (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

python
if allow_unsafe:
        return endpoint
    if not endpoint.startswith(SAFE_WIKI_PREFIXES):
        die("Refusing unsafe wiki endpoint. Use --allow-unsafe-endpoint only for trusted testing.")
    return endpoint

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Exposing --allow-unsafe-endpoint at the CLI level makes the bypass readily accessible and normalizes insecure operation despite the skill’s 'secure' framing. In adversarial prompting scenarios, this flag could be invoked to turn the tool into an arbitrary outbound HTTP requester.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tarkov_api.py (reported line 1162)May include surrounding context.

python
help="Wiki API endpoint (default: escapefromtarkov.fandom.com/api.php)",
    )
    p.add_argument(
        "--allow-unsafe-endpoint",
        action="store_true",
        help="Allow non-tarkov.dev endpoint (for trusted local testing only)",
    )

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises operational guidance that clearly involves network access, local file input, and likely environment use, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. That omission creates a governance gap: an agent may invoke broader capabilities than intended, making review, sandboxing, and least-privilege enforcement harder.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Dict, List

DEFAULT_ENDPOINT = "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql"
MAX_LIMIT = 100
SAFE_ENDPOINT_PREFIXES = (
    "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

md
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Dict, List

DEFAULT_ENDPOINT = "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql"
MAX_LIMIT = 100
SAFE_ENDPOINT_PREFIXES = (
    "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tarkov_api.py (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

python
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Dict, List

DEFAULT_ENDPOINT = "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql"
MAX_LIMIT = 100
SAFE_ENDPOINT_PREFIXES = (
    "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tarkov_api.py (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

python
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Dict, List

DEFAULT_ENDPOINT = "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql"
MAX_LIMIT = 100
SAFE_ENDPOINT_PREFIXES = (
    "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tarkov_api.py (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

python
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Dict, List

DEFAULT_ENDPOINT = "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql"
MAX_LIMIT = 100
SAFE_ENDPOINT_PREFIXES = (
    "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tarkov_api.py (reported line 1152)May include surrounding context.

python
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Dict, List

DEFAULT_ENDPOINT = "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql"
MAX_LIMIT = 100
SAFE_ENDPOINT_PREFIXES = (
    "https://api.tarkov.dev/graphql",

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The raw subcommand allows callers to submit arbitrary GraphQL queries and variables to the configured endpoint, bypassing the skill’s otherwise curated operations and guardrails. In an agent/tooling context, this expands the accessible API surface and can enable unexpected data access, higher-cost queries, or use of the tool for purposes outside the declared skill boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The tool markets itself as a 'secure helper' with safe controls, but the parser exposes a raw GraphQL mode and an unsafe-endpoint bypass that undermine that claim. This mismatch is security-relevant because operators or upstream agents may overtrust the tool and permit inputs they would otherwise block.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

This code file repeatedly sets --lang to en across multiple commands, which effectively biases output to a specific language by default. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a natural-language policy concern unless the locale constraint is clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.