T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- references/api.md:65
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party SDK Dependencies## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/api.md`, lines 65-75 **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium **Complete Code Snippet**: ```markdown ## SDKs Node: ```bash npm install @aistemsplitter/sdk ``` Python: ```bash pip install aistemsplitter ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation commands retrieve the latest available versions of third-party packages without an exact version, lockfile, integrity hash, or documented provenance verification. Consequently, the code installed during different executions can change without any corresponding change to the reviewed Skill. This creates a supply-chain risk if either registry package is compromised, transferred to an untrusted maintainer, subject to account takeover, or updated with malicious code. Package-controlled installation hooks or code executed when the SDK is imported could then run under the privileges of the user or agent environment that followed these instructions. The project contains no evidence that these packages are currently malicious. The vulnerability is the unbounded trust placed in mutable third-party releases. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the publisher account or release process for `@aistemsplitter/sdk` or `aistemsplitter`. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version to the relevant package registry. 3. An agent or user follows the documented unpinned `npm install` or `pip install` command. 4. The package manager resolves the command to the attacker-controlled release. 5. Malicious code executes through an installation lifecycle hook or when the SDK is imported and used. 6. The payload operates with the privileges and data access of the installing process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary code execution within the installation or runtime environment. Depending on that environment's permissions, an att ...[truncated 446 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin each SDK to a reviewed exact version rather than resolving the latest release. 2. Commit ecosystem-appropriate lockfiles and enforce integrity verification during installation. 3. Record and verify the packages' official publisher identities and source repositories. 4. Review package contents, dependency trees, and installation lifecycle scripts before approving upgrades. 5. Use automated dependency scanning and controlled update workflows. 6. Install dependencies in an isolated, least-privileged environment without unrelated credentials or filesystem access. 7. Prefer direct HTTPS REST requests when SDK functionality is unnecessary, reducing the third-party dependency surface. 8. If example commands must remain generic, explicitly warn users to substitute an approved pinned version and verify package integrity.