Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is transparent about using HubSpot, but it can directly change live CRM records with a powerful token and has no built-in confirmation or dry-run safeguard.
Review before installing. Use a dedicated HubSpot private app with the narrowest scopes possible, protect HUBSPOT_TOKEN as a secret, and avoid running create/update/associate commands against production data unless you have explicitly reviewed the target records and intended changes.
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read())
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
error = e.read().decode()
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
crm.objects.contacts.read, crm.objects.contacts.write, crm.objects.companies.read, crm.objects.companies.write, crm.objects.deals.read, crm.objects.deals.write, ticketsHUBSPOT_TOKEN=pat-na1-...
The README instructs users to export a long-lived private app bearer token but does not warn that this credential grants direct API access and must be handled as a secret. In an agent-skill context, users may paste or expose the token in logs, shell history, or shared environments, leading to unauthorized CRM access if the credential is disclosed.
This markdown file documents commands that create records, update existing records, and associate CRM objects in HubSpot, which can affect production customer data and system integrity. The description presents these write operations as routine usage examples but does not include any caution, confirmation expectation, or warning about acting on live CRM records.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
## How it works
All requests go directly to `https://api.hubapi.com/crm/v3` using your private app token as a Bearer token. No intermediary services, no OAuth flow, no additional dependencies.
The skill declares that it requires an environment variable and makes direct network calls, but it does not define any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates an authorization gap where a runtime may permit broader execution or network behavior than reviewers and users expect, increasing the risk of unintended data access or outbound requests.
The script exposes create, update, and associate operations that immediately modify live CRM data without any explicit confirmation, dry-run mode, or high-friction safety check. In an agent-skill context, this increases the risk of unintended or prompt-induced actions that alter customer records, create bad data, or change relationships in production systems.
No suspicious patterns detected.