Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected

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Web Scraper Pro

v1.1.0

Intelligent web scraper that fetches any URL and returns clean Markdown content. Triggers on requests like "帮我抓取网页", "获取这个网页内容", "fetch this URL", "scrape th...

0· 433·1 current·2 all-time
byLiuSir@codehourra
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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Suspicious
high confidence
Purpose & Capability
The name/description (web scraper → convert URL to Markdown) matches the instructions and code for fetching and converting web pages. However, the SKILL.md and payment.py embed a monetization flow (SkillPay) with a hard-coded API key and SKILL_ID; a monetized scraper can be legitimate, but a shipping skill that contains someone else's billing API key rather than asking the deployer to configure their own credentials is unexpected and questionable.
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Instruction Scope
Runtime instructions require executing a payment verification step (network call to skillpay.me) before any fetch. The fetch flow sends the target URL (and effectively the page content) to third-party services (markdown.new, defuddle.md, r.jina.ai, and an included Scrapling library). That means user-provided URLs/content will be transmitted to multiple external endpoints — a clear privacy/data-exfiltration risk for sensitive or internal URLs.
Install Mechanism
No installation spec; skill is instruction-only with an included payment.py file. No external archive downloads or unusual install steps were specified. Risk from install mechanism is low.
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Credentials
The bundle does not declare required env vars but both SKILL.md and payment.py include a hard-coded BILLING_API_KEY value (sk_...) and a SKILL_ID. Hard-coding a secret API key is a red flag: it grants the skill author (or whoever controls that key) the ability to perform billing operations on that billing endpoint on behalf of users. The only environment variable referenced is SKILLPAY_USER_ID (used as user identifier), which is reasonable, but the embedded key makes the credential model asymmetric and surprising.
Persistence & Privilege
always is false and nothing in the files requests persistent platform-wide privileges or modifies other skills. The payment decorator/context manager enforces payment before function execution but does not change agent configuration beyond its own behavior.
What to consider before installing
This skill will send any requested URL (and the resulting page content) to several external conversion services and will call a SkillPay billing API before performing the fetch. Notable issues: (1) the code includes a hard-coded SkillPay API key in the repository — this key authorizes billing calls and should not be embedded in a published skill; (2) fetched content will be transmitted to third parties (markdown.new, defuddle.md, r.jina.ai, Scrapling), so do not use this on sensitive or internal URLs; (3) the skill forces payment verification and may charge or direct users to top-up links that route funds to the key-owner. Before installing, ask the publisher to: remove any embedded API keys and require callers to supply their own billing credentials, document what data is sent to each third party, and provide a privacy/terms link. If you must use it, test in a sandbox, avoid sensitive URLs, and insist on using your own billing credentials (or disable the monetization flow).

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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