T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:177- Finding
Untrusted APK Acquisition Through Arbitrary Web Search
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 177-182
Vulnerability Type: Insecure third-party application acquisition
Risk Level: Mediummarkdown ### When MyApp Fails - Try browser: `adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d "https://official-site.com"` - Last resort: web search for APK downloadTechnical Analysis
The skill recommends using a web search to locate an APK when installation through MyApp fails. Search results are not a trusted software distribution channel and may direct the Agent to counterfeit websites, repackaged applications, or malicious APK files.
The instructions do not require validation of the publisher domain, Android package name, signing-certificate fingerprint, cryptographic checksum, or repository provenance before installation. The example domain is also a generic placeholder rather than a verified vendor endpoint. Consequently, an attacker who controls or promotes a search result could supply an APK whose displayed application identity resembles the intended software while its executable content has been modified.
This is a supply-chain weakness because the effective application payload may originate from an arbitrary and unverified third party.
Attack Path
- Installation through MyApp fails or is unavailable.
- The Agent follows the documented fallback and searches the web for an APK.
- An attacker-controlled or compromised download page appears in the results.
- The page supplies a counterfeit or modified APK using the expected application name and branding.
- Without mandatory signature, checksum, and provenance checks, the APK may be accepted for installation.
- The malicious application executes within the Android environment and requests or abuses any permissions granted to it.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation can result in arbitrary malicious application code executing with the Android application sandbox privileges and any additional permissions ...[truncated 600 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the instruction to search arbitrary websites for APK downloads.
- Restrict downloads to the application's verified publisher domain or an explicitly approved repository using HTTPS.
- Maintain an allowlist containing the expected package name and publisher signing-certificate SHA-256 fingerprint.
- Verify the APK signing certificate before installation and reject mismatches or unsigned packages.
- Where reproducible release hashes are available, compare the APK against a pinned SHA-256 digest obtained through a separate trusted channel.
- Require explicit user approval before sideloading any application outside the designated app store.
- Record the source URL, package identity, version, checksum, and signing identity for auditability.
- Fail safely when provenance cannot be verified rather than continuing with installation.