T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:23- Finding
Mutable Remote Source Is Downloaded, Compiled, and Executed
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:23-37
Additional Location:README.md:4
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution through an unpinned third-party repository
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash git clone https://github.com/52funny/pikpakclibash go buildtext ./pikpakcliThe project also references another mutable repository location:
text Install skill https://github.com/CN-CODEGOD/PIKSKILL/blob/main/SKILL.mdTechnical Analysis
The Skill instructs the Agent to clone the current state of a remote GitHub repository, compile it, and execute the resulting binary. The source is not pinned to a reviewed commit hash or immutable release, and the instructions do not require checksum or signature verification.
Consequently, the code that ultimately executes can change after this Skill has been reviewed. The audited project does not include the downloaded source, so the behavior of the resulting executable cannot be established from the package itself. The
README.mdinstallation link similarly references the mutablemainbranch.This behavior is best classified as remote payload retrieval and execution because a remote party controlling or compromising the referenced repository can modify the effective payload without changing the audited Skill package.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, a maintainer account, or the upstream publishing process.
- The attacker modifies the repository's default branch to include malicious Go code.
- The Agent follows
SKILL.mdand clones the mutable repository without selecting a trusted commit. - The Agent runs
go build, incorporating the attacker's code into the local executable. - The Agent executes
./pikpakcliunder the current user's identity. - During setup, the user supplies PikPak credentials as required by the Skill.
- T ...[truncated 1015 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the repository to a specific, reviewed commit hash rather than cloning and building the default branch.
- Prefer a signed, versioned release obtained from a trusted release channel.
- Publish and verify a cryptographic checksum, such as SHA-256, before executing any downloaded artifact.
- Verify release signatures against a documented and trusted maintainer key.
- Vendor the reviewed source into the Skill package where feasible so the audited and executed code are identical.
- Pin the
README.mdinstallation reference to an immutable commit URL instead of the mutablemainbranch. - Review the complete dependency graph and use reproducible builds before distributing binaries.
- Run the utility with least privilege in a restricted environment that does not expose unrelated files, credentials, or environment variables.
- Avoid passing credentials to an unverified executable. Use a narrowly scoped authentication mechanism where supported and protect configuration files with restrictive filesystem permissions.
