T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing
- Location
deepseek_bridge.py:10- Finding
External Import Path Enables Local Module Hijacking and Arbitrary Code Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
deepseek_bridge.py, lines 10–11
Vulnerability Type: Python module search-path hijacking
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python # Add openclaw-data to path for db_shared sys.path.insert(0, r"D:\openclaw-data") from db_shared import save_question, update_answerTechnical Analysis
The application prepends the fixed external directory
D:\openclaw-datatosys.pathand then importsdb_shared. Because this directory is placed at index zero, Python searches it before the project directory and other normal module locations.Although the project contains an audited
db_shared.py, this code does not guarantee that the bundled file will be imported. IfD:\openclaw-data\db_shared.pyexists, Python can load that external module instead. Python executes top-level module code during import, so a malicious replacement can run arbitrary code as soon as the bridge starts.Exploitation requires an attacker, compromised process, or lower-trust user to have write access to the external directory. The vulnerability crosses a trust boundary whenever that directory is writable by principals who should not be able to execute code under the bridge process's identity.
Attack Path
- An attacker obtains write access to
D:\openclaw-data. - The attacker creates or replaces
D:\openclaw-data\db_shared.py. - The malicious module defines the expected
save_questionandupdate_answerfunctions while including an attacker-controlled top-level payload. - A user or agent starts
deepseek_bridge.py. - The bridge prepends the attacker-writable directory to
sys.path. - Python imports the malicious external module and immediately executes its top-level code.
- The payload runs with the bridge process's privileges and can access its environment, local data, filesystem permissions, and network connectivity.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation provides arbitrary Python code execution with ...[truncated 658 chars]
- An attacker obtains write access to
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the external search-path modification:
python sys.path.insert(0, r"D:\openclaw-data")- Import the bundled module through a normal or explicit package-relative import. For example, package the project and use:
python from .db_shared import save_question, update_answerFor direct-script execution, use a package entry point rather than manipulating
sys.path.-
If an external module is operationally unavoidable:
- Store it in an administrator-controlled, read-only installation directory.
- Restrict write permissions to trusted deployment identities.
- Load it by an explicitly validated path rather than changing the global module search order.
- Verify the file against a trusted cryptographic hash or signed manifest before loading.
- Refuse startup if ownership, permissions, path resolution, or integrity validation fails.
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Run the bridge under a dedicated least-privilege account and expose only the minimum required environment variables, files, and network access.
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Add a startup test that verifies
db_shared.__file__resolves to the expected packaged path and fails closed otherwise.