Back to skill

Security audit

Clawapi Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This API-provider skill is mostly coherent, but it tells agents to use wallet private keys for unattended crypto deposits and to duplicate API keys in plaintext files.

Review before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable with a third-party paid model provider, and do not give an agent a wallet private key or permission to auto-deposit funds. Prefer manual deposits through the website, keep any API key in one protected secret location, and treat remotely fetched provider docs as data to review rather than instructions to execute.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:203
Finding

Autonomous Cryptocurrency Transfers to a Hardcoded Deposit Address

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:37
Finding

Unreviewed Mutable Instructions Retrieved from a Remote Service

Content
View full analysis
**🤖 Agent:** Fetch `https://clawapi.org/api/skill` for live docs, or `https://clawapi.org/api/skill?format=json` for structured data. ``` `SKILL.md:164`: ```markdown - Fetch `https://clawapi.org/api/skill` for latest models rather than hardcoding. ``` `SKILL.md:324-332`: ```text Have wallet private key + USDC/USDT balance → GET /api/auth/cli?wallet=0x... (get nonce) → Sign message with private key → POST /api/auth/cli (get API key) → Transfer USDC/USDT to deposit address (fund account) → GET /api/skill (read docs) → Write openclaw.json (configure) → Start using 8 models (build) → Balance low? Transfer more USDC/USDT (refuel) → Keep building ♻️ ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the agent to fetch current documentation from a provider-controlled endpoint and use it as operational guidance. Unlike pinned package content, this remote material can change after the Skill has passed static review. If the response is treated as instructions rather than strictly validated data, the external endpoint becomes an indirect control channel over the agent. The endpoint could introduce new payment destinations, request access to additional credentials, alter model routing, or provide commands unrelated to the reviewed functionality. This behavior is especially dangerous because the surrounding workflow discusses wallet signing, API credentials, configuration-file writes, and cryptocurrency transfers. Mutable instructions can therefore influence operations involving sensitive capabilities. This is classified as instruction hijacking rather than remote payload execution because the ...[truncated 1431 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:294
Finding

Bearer API Key Duplicated into Plaintext Configuration

Content
View full analysis
**⚠️ Critical:** OpenClaw loads the API key from `models.json` at runtime, NOT from `.env`. If you only update `.env`, requests will still use the old key from `models.json` and fail with 401. Always update both files. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill explicitly requires the same bearer credential to be stored in two plaintext files, including a JSON file where it is hardcoded as a literal value. Credential duplication expands the number of locations that must be protected, rotated, and sanitized. An API key must be sent to the intended provider to authenticate requests, but persisting a second plaintext copy is not required by the Skill's declared model-provider functionality. Plaintext configuration may be exposed through permissive file permissions, local process access, backups, diagnostic archives, accidental source-control commits, shell or editor artifacts, and support bundles. Because the key is described as universal across all available models and is connected to a funded account, theft may enable billable requests until the credential is revoked. ### Attack Path 1. The user or agent follows the setup instructions and writes the bearer key to both `.env` and `models.json`. 2. The JSON file is copied into a backup, diagnostic bundle, synchronization service, or another location with weaker access controls; alternatively, another local user or process reads ...[truncated 1035 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

YARA rule 'agent_skill_mcp_tool_poisoning_metadata': MCP/tool metadata poisoning indicators in tool schemas or skill manifests [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: clawapi-provider
description: "Build your AI Company — 8 models across 4 providers act as your CEO, CTO, CMO, CFO, and Workers. Crypto-native, pay-as-you-go with USDC/USDT. No GPU needed."
version: 1.3.0
metadata:
  openclaw:
    requires:
      env:
        - CLAWAPI_KEY
    primaryEnv: CLAWAPI_KEY
    emoji: "🦞"
    homepage: https://clawapi.org
    docs: https://clawapi.org/api/skill
    tags:
      - ai-models
      - api-provider
      - opc
      - one-person-company
      - claw-company
      - claude
      - openai
      - gemini
      - crypto
      - llm
---

# ClawAPI — Air for Agents 🦞

>

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This section explicitly instructs autonomous wallet-based authentication, API key creation, and ERC-20 fund transfers without any explicit confirmation step, financial-risk warning, or transaction verification guidance. In an agent skill context, that is dangerous because it normalizes irreversible on-chain payments and sensitive key handling as routine autonomous actions, increasing the chance of unintended loss of funds or unsafe secret exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to place a live API key into both an environment file and a hardcoded runtime JSON file. Duplicating credentials across plaintext files expands exposure, increases the chance of accidental leakage through backups, logs, or source control, and undermines secure secret-management practices.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 300)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. Environment variable (referenced by openclaw.json)
~/.openclaw/.env
  CLAWAPI_KEY=sk-claw-your_new_key_here

# 2. Agent models file (hardcoded key used at runtime)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 172)May include surrounding context.

API Format

bash
curl https://clawapi.org/api/v1/chat/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-claw-..." \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"claude-opus-4-6","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Hello"}]}'

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The phrase 'No Human Needed' and the statement that setup can be completed 'without any human intervention' encourage removal of human approval for sensitive financial and authentication actions. In this context, that materially increases risk because the same section includes wallet signing and token transfer steps, which should never be implied as safe to automate by default.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.