T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:11- Finding
Automatic Use of a Persistent Authenticated Browser Profile
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it uses a persistent logged-in browser profile for broad browsing requests and includes unsafe profile-handling instructions.
Install only if you intentionally want agents to browse with the main-identity logged-in browser profile. Prefer a dedicated automation profile, require explicit confirmation before authenticated browsing, remove --no-sandbox, and do not delete SingletonLock unless you have verified the profile is not in use.
SKILL.md:11Automatic Use of a Persistent Authenticated Browser Profile
SKILL.md:27Chromium Sandbox Disabled While Processing Untrusted Web Content
SKILL.md:18Unconditional Deletion of Chromium Profile Concurrency Lock
The skill advertises use of a persistent browser profile (main-identity) but does not warn that it will access and modify a logged-in local browser state. Because the skill is user-invocable and designed for authenticated sites, the missing disclosure materially increases the risk of unintended access to private account data or actions performed under the user's identity.
The explicit rm -f command performs destructive filesystem modification on a local browser-profile path, which is a classic tool-parameter abuse pattern when embedded in an auto-triggerable skill. In this skill's context, it is more dangerous because it targets a persistent authenticated profile, so misuse or path changes could damage browser state, interfere with live sessions, or enable unsafe operational habits around shell-based deletion.
每次抓取前先删 SingletonLock:
rm -f /home/kncao/.openclaw/browser-profiles/main-identity/SingletonLock
The instructions direct deletion of a local file (SingletonLock) in the user's browser profile without any user-facing notice or safety checks. Even though the target path is specific, silently modifying files under a persistent profile can disrupt running browser sessions, cause state corruption, or normalize unsafe file-deletion behavior in agent skills.
The trigger conditions are broad enough to auto-activate the skill for generic requests like 'search the web' or when certain sites are merely mentioned, causing use of a persistent logged-in browser without explicit user awareness. In this context, that can unintentionally expose authenticated content, cookies-backed session data, or actions tied to the operator's identity on third-party sites.
The natural-language content of the skill is entirely in Chinese, including the description, trigger conditions, and operational notes, without indicating that language choice is optional or user-configurable. This can violate language/locale policy where skills should not impose a specific language absent opt-in or a documented regional justification.