TIA CICD DIFF

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 3:24 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill has a coherent industrial project diffing purpose, but it tells agents to run an unbundled external script with unclear provenance and path control.

Review before installing. Only use this skill with a known, trusted TIA Openness diff script invoked by an explicit path, ideally with a pinned checksum or trusted code-signing check, and run it in a dedicated working directory with access limited to the project files being compared.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:8

Finding

Untrusted External Diff Script Execution

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 8–14
Vulnerability Type: Unverified external dependency execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

markdown

You can:
- Call external scripts that use SiemensEngineering.dll (Openness) to extract XML/SCL from .zap18 archives.
- Read and write files in a working directory.
- Return a machine-readable JSON summary of changes and a human-friendly Markdown explanation.

When the agent asks you to diff two .zap18 files:
1) Locate the baseline and new .zap18 paths.
2) Run the external Openness diff script (e.g. `tia_diff.bat baseline.zap18 new.zap18`).

Technical Analysis

The Skill explicitly directs an agent with shell and filesystem access to execute an external diff script. The example invokes tia_diff.bat using a bare command name rather than a fixed, trusted path. No integrity hash, digital signature, trusted distribution source, ownership requirement, or pre-execution review procedure is specified.

The package does not contain the implementation it claims should be executed. Scripts/README.md refers to TIA-Openness-Diff.ps1, but that script is absent from the audited project. Consequently, the behavior of the executable dependency—including its handling of .zap18 files, temporary directories, output data, and cleanup—cannot be verified from the package.

When a shell resolves a bare command name, it may search the current directory or entries in the process search path, depending on the host configuration and invocation method. An attacker able to place a matching script in one of those locations could cause attacker-controlled code to run in place of the intended Siemens diff utility. This constitutes an unsafe external dependency and command-resolution trust issue.

Attack Path

1. An attacker places a malicious file named tia_diff.bat in the working directory or another location searched during command resolution. ...[truncated 1140 chars]

Remediation

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Remediation Suggestions

1. Bundle the required diff implementation in the Skill package so it can be reviewed and versioned with the instructions.
2. Invoke the script through a canonical absolute path under a trusted, access-controlled installation directory; do not rely on the current directory or command search path.
3. Verify a pinned cryptographic hash or trusted code-signing certificate immediately before execution, and fail closed if verification fails.
4. Restrict write permissions on the script and its parent directories to trusted administrators or the deployment mechanism.
5. Pass baseline, new-project, and output paths as separate, correctly quoted parameters. Reject unexpected file types and normalize paths before use.
6. Run the utility under a least-privileged account with access limited to the required project files and a dedicated working directory.
7. Create temporary directories securely with unpredictable names, restrictive permissions, and reliable cleanup.
8. Validate the generated JSON against a strict schema before processing it, and do not treat script output as additional agent instructions.
9. Update Scripts/README.md and SKILL.md to reference the same bundled implementation and document its exact trusted path, version, checksum, and execution procedure.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep