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Security audit

Wolai MCP 技能

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent Wolai note-management integration, but it gives unsafe and contradictory guidance that may lead users to reveal their Wolai access token in chat.

Install only if you are comfortable granting the assistant-driven workflow broad access to your Wolai notes. Do not paste the Wolai token into chat; configure it manually through a local environment variable or secure secret store, use the narrowest token Wolai supports, and be careful with delete or permanent delete operations. If a token has already been shared in chat, revoke it and create a new one.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:121
Finding

Credential Disclosure Through Chat-Based Token Configuration

Content
View full analysis
MCP Access -> Create Token" Write-Host "" Write-Host "Configuration methods:" Write-Host " Method 1 (easiest): Tell the token directly to the AI assistant and let it write the token" Write-Host " Method 2: Open sysdm.cpl -> Advanced -> Environment Variables -> create WOLAI_MCP_TOKEN" Write-Host " Method 3: Run [System.Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable('WOLAI_MCP_TOKEN','sk-xxx','User') in PowerShell" Write-Host "" Write-Host "Restart WorkBuddy after configuration" exit 1 } ``` The snippet above is an English rendering of the corresponding user-facing strings; the executable structure and security-relevant instruction are unchanged. ### Technical Analysis The credential precheck instructs users to submit their Wolai MCP bearer token directly to an AI assistant. Bearer tokens must be treated as secrets because possession is sufficient for authentication. Entering such a token into a conversation can expose it to conversation history, application logs, telemetry, model context, tool traces, debugging records, or anyone who can access the relevant session. This instruction also directly conflicts with the warning at `SKILL.md:38`, which tells users not to paste the token into chat. The contradictory guidance makes accidental disclosure more likely, especially because the unsafe method is described as the easiest option. The network transmission implemented elsewhere in the Skill is not itself an unrelated exfiltration mechanism: t ...[truncated 1811 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (9)

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The credential precheck block normalizes secret disclosure to the assistant as a supported setup path. Because this skill supports broad read/write/delete actions against Wolai pages and blocks, leaked tokens could be abused to read private notes, alter content, or permanently delete data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Suggesting that a user hand their token to the AI assistant for setup is unsafe secret-handling guidance. In this skill's context, the token grants direct Wolai account access over a remote MCP API, so disclosure to the assistant or chat system can immediately compromise note contents and permit destructive actions such as modification or deletion.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

md
通过 wolai 官方 MCP 协议操作笔记,功能全面,支持读取、写入、搜索、删除、修改等所有操作。

MCP 服务地址:`https://api.wolai.com/v1/mcp`

---

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md
通过 wolai 官方 MCP 协议操作笔记,功能全面,支持读取、写入、搜索、删除、修改等所有操作。

MCP 服务地址:`https://api.wolai.com/v1/mcp`

---

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

md
通过 wolai 官方 MCP 协议操作笔记,功能全面,支持读取、写入、搜索、删除、修改等所有操作。

MCP 服务地址:`https://api.wolai.com/v1/mcp`

---

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 994)May include surrounding context.

md
通过 wolai 官方 MCP 协议操作笔记,功能全面,支持读取、写入、搜索、删除、修改等所有操作。

MCP 服务地址:`https://api.wolai.com/v1/mcp`

---

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs users to paste their Wolai token into the AI assistant, which directly contradicts earlier warnings not to share the token in chat. This can expose a bearer credential to the model, platform logs, conversation history, or downstream tool integrations, enabling unauthorized access to the user's Wolai workspace.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The comments say the token source is '$env:WOLAI_TOKEN', but the actual code reads '$env:WOLAI_MCP_TOKEN'. This is a direct documentation-to-code contradiction that can mislead users about which credential is being used.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The Python implementation's comments claim the token comes from environment variable 'WOLAI_TOKEN', but get_token() actually reads 'WOLAI_MCP_TOKEN'. This is an explicit contradiction in the code documentation, not merely an omission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.