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Security audit

Alibaba Cloud Security Center SAS

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Alibaba Cloud Security Center helper that uses expected cloud credentials and Alibaba OpenAPI endpoints, with no evidence of hidden exfiltration, persistence, or destructive automation.

Install only if you intend to manage Alibaba Cloud Security Center. Use least-privilege credentials, review the target region and resource IDs, and require an explicit confirmation before any Create, Update, Modify, or Set operation in a production account.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (9)

Tainted flow: 'timeout' from os.getenv (line 34, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
def fetch_json(url: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "codex-skill"})
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
        return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill is advertised as managing Security Center resources and configurations, but the documented executable path primarily performs OpenAPI metadata discovery and local artifact generation. This mismatch can cause operators or an agent to invoke the skill in broader, more privileged situations than warranted, creating a trust and authorization gap.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill declares operational behavior that can access environment variables, write files, and make network requests, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. This increases the chance of unintended credential access or external communication without clear review, especially because the skill explicitly prioritizes cloud credentials from environment variables.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The trigger text is broad enough to match many generic Security Center requests, which can cause over-activation of a skill that has network, file-write, and credential-dependent behavior. In an agent system, ambiguous activation boundaries increase the risk of the wrong skill being selected and acting on sensitive cloud contexts without sufficient specificity.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The workflow encourages use of Create/Update/Modify/Set APIs but does not require an explicit destructive-action warning or confirmation step. In a cloud security product, configuration changes can disable protections, alter policies, or affect production coverage, so missing warnings materially raises the risk of accidental harmful changes.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.