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Security audit

Alibaba Cloud AI Audio TTS Voice Clone

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Alibaba Cloud voice-cloning helper with expected credential and output-file use, but users should install dependencies carefully and only clone voices with consent.

Install the SDK in an isolated environment, prefer pinned dependencies, keep the DashScope API key narrowly scoped, and use the skill only with voice samples you have permission to clone. Review saved output files because request JSON may include text and voice-sample references.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:21
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party SDK Installation Creates Supply-Chain Risk## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 21-27 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ```bash - Install SDK in a virtual environment: ```bash python3 -m venv .venv . .venv/bin/activate python -m pip install dashscope ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions retrieve the latest available `dashscope` package and its transitive dependencies without specifying reviewed versions or verifying package hashes. Consequently, the code installed by this command may differ between executions and may change after the Skill itself has been audited. The package name is consistent with the declared Alibaba Cloud integration, and there is no evidence that the Skill intentionally references a malicious or misspelled package. However, an unpinned installation remains exposed to upstream package compromise, compromised transitive dependencies, malicious release replacement, and unexpected security or compatibility regressions. The use of a virtual environment limits modification of the global Python environment, but it does not sandbox package installation or execution. Package build hooks and subsequently imported SDK code execute with the operating-system permissions of the user running the command. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `dashscope` distribution account, one of its transitive dependencies, or the relevant package-distribution infrastructure. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that satisfies the unrestricted dependency request. 3. A user follows the documented `python -m pip install dashscope` instruction. 4. Pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release or dependency. 5. Malicious installation hooks or runtime code execute with the invoking user's privileges. 6. Depending on those privileges, the payload could access local files, environment variables such as `DASHSCOPE_API_KEY`, Alibaba Cloud credent ...[truncated 742 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `dashscope` to an explicitly reviewed version, for example: ```bash python -m pip install "dashscope==<reviewed-version>" ``` 2. Pin all transitive dependencies through a reviewed lock file generated with a dependency-management tool such as `pip-tools`. 3. Record cryptographic hashes and install with hash enforcement: ```bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 4. Configure pip to use an approved package index and avoid untrusted extra indexes. 5. Periodically scan the locked dependency set for known vulnerabilities and review dependency updates before changing pins. 6. Continue using an isolated virtual environment and avoid installing or executing the SDK with root or administrator privileges. 7. Prefer `DASHSCOPE_API_KEY` through a narrowly scoped process environment, apply least-privilege cloud permissions, and ensure credential files have restrictive filesystem permissions.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The skill documents local helper and validation commands that read files from the repository and write artifacts under an output directory, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That mismatch can cause an agent runtime to grant broader file access than reviewers expect, increasing the risk of unintended file reads/writes or abuse through prompt/tool confusion.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
The workflow text instructs users to determine whether the operation is read-only or mutating and to run a minimal read-only query first. For a voice-cloning TTS skill, the documented interface only covers creating cloned voices and synthesizing audio, so this guidance contradicts the actual intent and available operations rather than merely omitting detail.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.