Alibaba Cloud Media ICE

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 4:30 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill is a coherent Alibaba Cloud ICE management helper with disclosed API discovery, credential expectations, cloud operations, and local evidence output; users should treat saved evidence as potentially sensitive.

Install only if you intend to let an agent help with Alibaba Cloud ICE. Use least-privilege RAM or STS credentials, confirm region and workflow scope before mutations, and review files saved under output/aliyun-ice-manage/ for secrets, signed URLs, customer data, and sensitive media metadata before keeping or sharing them.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence
• Taint Tracking: Direct Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection

Findings (10)

Tainted flow: 'timeout' from os.getenv (line 30, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical

• Category: Data Flow
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

python

def fetch_json(url: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "codex-skill"})
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
        return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The documented purpose presents the skill as managing ICE workflows and jobs, but the observable behavior described here is primarily API metadata discovery and local documentation generation. This mismatch can mislead operators about what the skill actually does, weakening security review and enabling unexpected network access and file creation under the guise of routine cloud-management automation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The skill uses capabilities associated with environment access, filesystem writes, and network access, but it does not declare any tool restrictions or permissions scope. That creates an authorization ambiguity where a caller or agent may execute broader actions than expected, increasing the risk of credential exposure, unintended outbound requests, or local persistence without explicit review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

Validation

bash

mkdir -p output/aliyun-ice-manage
python -m py_compile skills/media/ice/aliyun-ice-manage/scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py
echo "py_compile_ok" > output/aliyun-ice-manage/validate.txt

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The template instructs users to save full request payloads and API responses, plus workflow IDs, job IDs, and output object paths, without any warning to avoid secrets, tokens, signed URLs, internal identifiers, or customer media metadata. In a cloud media workflow context, these artifacts can contain sensitive operational data and may be retained insecurely or shared broadly as troubleshooting evidence.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

md

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

python

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)