Alibaba Cloud AI Chatbot

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 4:36 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This is a coherent Alibaba Cloud chatbot management skill with expected credential and API use, but users should be careful with live cloud changes.

Install this only if you want the agent to help manage Alibaba Cloud Chatbot resources. Use least-privilege Alibaba credentials, confirm the exact region, resource ID, and intended change before any mutation, and keep secrets out of saved output artifacts.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Taint Tracking: Direct Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands

Findings (11)

Tainted flow: 'timeout' from os.getenv (line 34, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical

• Category: Data Flow
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python

def fetch_json(url: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "codex-skill"})
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
        return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill advertises operational behavior that can access environment credentials, write files, and make networked API calls, but it does not declare any explicit tool or permission scope. This creates an authorization ambiguity where an agent may invoke sensitive capabilities without clear guardrails, increasing the risk of unintended cloud actions or secret exposure during execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

The invocation description is broad enough to match many generic chatbot configuration or troubleshooting requests, which can cause over-selection of this skill in situations where cloud-management actions were not intended. In the context of a cloud administration skill, accidental activation is more dangerous because it may lead to credential use, API enumeration, or real configuration changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

The workflow explicitly includes create, update, modify, and set operations but does not require a clear warning that these actions can change production chatbot resources. In a cloud-control context, this omission increases the chance of destructive or unintended changes being executed under ambiguous user requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

md

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

python

output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 88% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs use of environment variables and shared credential files but does not warn against printing, persisting, or including secrets in outputs and logs. Because the skill also directs saving artifacts under an output directory, there is a realistic risk of accidental credential leakage into evidence files or command transcripts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 82% confidence

Finding

Telling the agent to choose 'the most reasonable region' when no region is set allows it to make a deployment-locale decision without explicit user approval. In cloud environments, region choice can affect data residency, billing, and which resources are modified, so even a seemingly small assumption can lead to unintended impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 78% confidence

Finding

This code creates the output directory and writes both a JSON file and a Markdown file, but the only user-facing disclosure appears after the writes complete. Under the code-file warning criteria, file writes should have some visible disclosure, confirmation, or explanatory comment/docstring warning the user about the action before it occurs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.