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Security audit

Alibaba Cloud AI Cloud Call Center

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Alibaba Cloud Cloud Call Center management skill, but it should be used carefully because it can guide live cloud configuration changes using Alibaba credentials.

Install only if you intend to let an agent help manage Alibaba Cloud CCC. Use least-privilege Alibaba credentials, review region and resource IDs before every write action, and treat saved output files as operational evidence that may contain resource details.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (9)

Tainted flow: 'timeout' from os.getenv (line 34, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python
def fetch_json(url: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "codex-skill"})
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
        return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose is CCC management, but the described behavior includes broader metadata discovery, local artifact generation, and arbitrary product/version overrides. That mismatch undermines user consent and review, because a user invoking a CCC-specific skill may unknowingly authorize broader network activity and non-CCC interactions, which can be abused to expand access or exfiltrate information into generated files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes capabilities involving environment access, file writes, and network use, but does not declare an explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. This creates an authorization and transparency gap: consumers may not understand that the skill can read credentials from the environment, fetch remote metadata, and write local artifacts, increasing the risk of unintended credential exposure or broader-than-expected actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The workflow explicitly recommends mutating APIs such as Create, Update, Modify, and Set without a prominent safety warning or confirmation requirement for live environments. In a cloud call-center context, accidental changes can disrupt routing, agents, numbers, or production service behavior, making this more dangerous than a read-only cloud inventory skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of AccessKey environment variables and shared credential files but does not include concrete guidance to prevent secret leakage, such as avoiding logging, limiting scope, and using least privilege. Because the skill also involves network calls and writing output artifacts, insecure credential handling could lead to credential disclosure or misuse of Alibaba Cloud resources.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

md
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

python
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)