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Security audit

Alibaba Cloud Security CloudFW

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Alibaba Cloud Firewall helper that uses expected cloud APIs and local output files, with no artifact-backed evidence of hidden exfiltration or persistence.

Install this only for Alibaba Cloud Cloud Firewall work, and use a least-privilege Alibaba Cloud account. Review any planned Create/Update/Modify/Set firewall operations before running them, and avoid saving AccessKeys or sensitive API responses in the output directory.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (9)

Tainted flow: 'timeout' from os.getenv (line 34, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python
def fetch_json(url: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "codex-skill"})
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
        return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose is Cloud Firewall management, but the documented executable path emphasizes metadata discovery and local artifact generation instead of actual firewall policy/resource operations. This mismatch can mislead users and orchestration systems into invoking the skill in broader situations than intended, causing unnecessary network access and collection/storage of data outside the stated task scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill has access to sensitive capabilities (environment variables, filesystem writes, and network access) but does not declare or constrain its tool scope. In a credentialed cloud-management context, this increases the chance of unintended secret access, arbitrary outbound requests, or persistence of sensitive API outputs without clear guardrails.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The invocation text is broad enough to trigger on generic firewall troubleshooting and status-check requests, not just Alibaba Cloud Cloud Firewall tasks. In a security operations context, overbroad routing can cause the wrong skill to handle requests, leading to inappropriate credential use, irrelevant API calls, or changes in the wrong environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly directs use of AccessKey environment variables and shared credential files but does not include strong handling rules for secrets. In a cloud administration workflow, this is dangerous because the same skill also uses network and file output paths, increasing the risk that credentials or credential-derived sensitive responses are exposed through logs, artifacts, or unintended commands.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sources.md (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

md
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_openapi_meta_apis.py (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

python
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.