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Security audit

Alibaba Cloud Data Analytics Dataanalysisgbi

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Alibaba Cloud DataAnalysisGBI helper; it uses expected cloud credentials and API metadata discovery, with no evidence of hidden persistence, exfiltration, or destructive automation.

Install only if you intend an agent to work with Alibaba Cloud DataAnalysisGBI. Use least-privilege Alibaba Cloud credentials, review any proposed Create/Update/Modify/Set action before it runs, and keep generated API-response artifacts in the documented output directory because they may contain operational details.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (9)

Tainted flow: 'timeout' from os.getenv (line 34, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
def fetch_json(url: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "codex-skill"})
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
        return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The declared purpose says the skill manages DataAnalysisGBI resources, but the documented executable path centers on metadata harvesting and local artifact generation instead of direct service operations. This mismatch is dangerous because it obscures the real behavior from reviewers and users, making it easier to justify unnecessary network access, credential use, and file creation under a misleading description.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill declares no explicit tool scope even though it clearly expects environment access, local file writes, and network/API usage. This weakens governance and reviewability because an agent may invoke broader capabilities than a user or platform policy expects, especially when cloud credentials and external API calls are involved.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    url = (
        f"https://api.aliyun.com/meta/v1/products/{args.product_code}"
        f"/versions/{args.version}/api-docs.json"
    )
    payload = fetch_json(url, timeout)
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding
The skill advertises create, update, modify, and set operations against live cloud resources but does not prominently warn that these actions can change production state, incur cost, or disrupt service. In a cloud-management context, even ordinary mutations can have real operational impact if performed without explicit acknowledgement and safeguards.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to source Alibaba Cloud credentials from environment variables and a shared credentials file without an explicit warning about sensitive secret handling, minimization, or non-disclosure. In an agent setting, this increases the chance of overcollection, accidental logging, or use of credentials beyond what the user intended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.