T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:66
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party SDK Dependencies## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 66 and 116 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash python -m pip install alibabacloud_ecs20140526 alibabacloud_tea_openapi alibabacloud_credentials ``` ```bash python -m pip install alibabacloud_ecs20140526 alibabacloud_cms20190101 alibabacloud_tea_openapi alibabacloud_credentials ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions specify package names without exact versions or cryptographic hashes. Consequently, each installation resolves the package versions available from the configured Python package index at execution time rather than a set of previously reviewed artifacts. This creates a supply-chain exposure: if one of the named packages or a transitive dependency publishes a compromised release, that release could be installed automatically. Python packages may execute code during installation or when imported by the Skill scripts. The package names appear consistent with the declared Alibaba Cloud functionality, and the audit found no evidence that they are intentionally malicious or obtained from an unofficial source. The vulnerability is the lack of reproducible, integrity-verified dependency resolution. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises an upstream package account, release process, distribution artifact, or transitive dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under a dependency name used by the Skill. 3. A user follows the documented `pip install` command after the compromised version becomes available. 4. Pip resolves and installs the malicious release because no version or artifact hash is constrained. 5. Malicious code executes during installation or when an affected module is imported. 6. The payload can access the local process environment, including Alibaba Cloud credentials, and issue requests with the permissions of the configured cloud identity. ### Impact Assessment Suc ...[truncated 670 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example: ```text alibabacloud_ecs20140526==REVIEWED_VERSION alibabacloud_cms20190101==REVIEWED_VERSION alibabacloud_tea_openapi==REVIEWED_VERSION alibabacloud_credentials==REVIEWED_VERSION ``` 2. Generate and commit a lock file that also constrains transitive dependencies. 3. Require cryptographic hashes for resolved distributions, such as by using `pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt`. 4. Retrieve packages only from an explicitly configured, trusted package index or an organization-controlled artifact mirror. 5. Review dependency updates before changing the lock file, and use automated vulnerability and provenance scanning. 6. Continue installing dependencies in an isolated virtual environment and avoid running pip with elevated operating-system privileges. 7. Use short-lived Alibaba Cloud credentials and a least-privileged RAM role so that compromise of the Python environment has limited cloud impact.