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Security audit

Alibaba Cloud AI Audio TTS Voice Clone

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Alibaba Cloud voice-cloning helper with expected credential, audio, and output handling, though users should pin the SDK and protect voice-cloning artifacts.

Before installing, use a dedicated virtual environment, pin and review the dashscope SDK version, keep the API key out of logs, and only use voice samples and persisted voice_id values when you have consent and a clear retention plan.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:20
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party SDK Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 20–24 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash python3 -m venv .venv . .venv/bin/activate python -m pip install dashscope ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation command retrieves the latest available `dashscope` package from the user's configured Python package index without specifying a reviewed version or verifying cryptographic hashes. Although `dashscope` is consistent with the Skill's declared Alibaba Cloud functionality, the installation is not reproducible and implicitly trusts the package index and every future release. A compromised upstream release, index substitution, or malicious package supplied through a misconfigured index could introduce attacker-controlled installation or runtime code. The audited project does not itself contain a malicious dependency or payload. This finding concerns the supply-chain exposure created by the documented installation procedure. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream package, the configured package index, or the user's package-index configuration. 2. The user follows the documented `python -m pip install dashscope` instruction. 3. pip retrieves and installs the attacker-controlled package version. 4. Malicious code executes during installation or when the SDK is subsequently imported and used. 5. The code operates with the invoking user's permissions and may access credentials or voice-cloning data available to that process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide code execution with the privileges of the user running pip or the voice-cloning workflow. Depending on the local environment, exposed resources could include: - `DASHSCOPE_API_KEY` and other environment variables. - Credentials readable from the user's home directory. - Enrollment voice samples and generated audio. - Request and ...[truncated 282 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `dashscope` to an exact version that has been reviewed and tested: ```bash python -m pip install "dashscope==<reviewed-version>" ``` 2. Prefer a committed dependency lock or requirements file containing cryptographic hashes, and install it with hash enforcement: ```bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Document the expected official package index and prevent untrusted or unintended extra indexes from participating in dependency resolution. 4. Review dependency updates before changing the pinned version, including transitive dependencies and release provenance. 5. Install dependencies before exporting `DASHSCOPE_API_KEY` or otherwise making service credentials available to the environment. 6. Use a dedicated virtual environment and a least-privileged operating-system account for installation and execution.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill documents file read/write behavior through helper scripts and output generation, but it does not declare any corresponding tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates a trust-boundary problem: an agent or reviewer cannot reliably tell what filesystem capabilities the skill expects, increasing the risk of unintended file access or writes when the skill is executed in an environment with broader privileges.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The skill documentation describes a narrowly scoped voice-cloning and synthesis workflow, but the workflow section instructs the operator to determine whether an operation is 'read-only or mutating' and to run a 'minimal read-only query first.' That language contradicts the actual documented interface, which is centered on synthesis/voice-clone requests rather than query-style resource inspection.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.