T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
scripts/clawshorts-daemon.sh:28- Finding
Python Code Injection Through an Unvalidated Device Address
- Content
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255 for o in ip.split('.')): sys.exit(1) " 2>/dev/null } ``` ### Technical Analysis The function inserts the untrusted `ip` shell variable directly into dynamically generated Python source: ```python ip = '$ip' ``` Validation only occurs after Python has parsed and begun executing the generated program. An argument containing a single quote can terminate the intended Python string and introduce additional Python statements. For example, a conceptual argument shaped like the following can execute a command before the regular-expression validation fails: ```text x'; __import__("os").system("id"); # ``` The resulting Python source begins as: ```python ip = 'x'; __import__("os").system("id"); #' ``` Consequently, this is not merely a validation bypass. It is arbitrary Python and operating-system command execution. The vulnerable fallback can be reached when the Python daemon is not executable or when `FORCE_BASH_DAEMON=1` is used. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker causes a user or automation process to invoke `clawshorts-daemon.sh` with a crafted device-address argument. 2. The shell assigns the argument to `IPS` and passes each resulting value to `validate_ip`. 3. `validate_ip` interpolates the value into the source string supplied to `python3 -c`. 4. A quote in the argument terminates the intended Python string. 5. Injected Python statements execute before the subsequent IP checks reject the value. 6. The injected code can invoke operating-system commands with the identity and environment of t ...[truncated 798 chars]- Remediation
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