T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/data-scraper.py:82- Finding
Unrestricted URL Fetching Enables Server-Side Requests to Internal Resources
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/data-scraper.py, lines 82 and 147
Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)-like unrestricted network access
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=30)The same unrestricted request behavior is present in the API retrieval function:
python response = requests.get(endpoint, headers=headers, timeout=30) response.raise_for_status() result["status"] = "success" result["data"] = response.json()Technical Analysis
Both
urlandendpointoriginate from command-line arguments or a user-provided URL list. They are passed directly torequests.get()without validating the URL scheme, destination hostname, resolved IP address, or redirect destination.Arbitrary public URL retrieval is necessary for the declared scraping functionality. However, the implementation does not distinguish public websites from loopback, private, reserved, link-local, or cloud metadata addresses. Consequently, the process can issue requests to resources that are reachable from the Agent environment but unavailable to an external party.
The API command is particularly significant because it stores the parsed JSON response in
result["data"], after which the result is printed or written to an output file. The scraping command does not currently return the fetched response body, but it can still interact with internal services and reveal limited status or error information.Attack Path
- An attacker causes an Agent or user to invoke the Skill with a malicious
--endpoint,--url, or entry in--urls-file. - The supplied destination points to a local service, private network host, link-local service, or cloud metadata endpoint.
requests.get()connects to that destination using the network privileges of the Skill runtime.- For an API endpoint returning JSON, the response is ...[truncated 1038 chars]
- An attacker causes an Agent or user to invoke the Skill with a malicious
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Parse every destination before making a request and permit only explicitly supported schemes, preferably HTTPS.
- Resolve the hostname and reject every resolved address belonging to loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, or unspecified address ranges.
- Explicitly block cloud metadata destinations, including link-local metadata addresses and provider-specific metadata hostnames.
- Disable automatic redirects or validate the scheme, hostname, and resolved IP address of every redirect target before following it.
- Consider requiring an explicit hostname allowlist when the Skill runs in an environment with access to sensitive internal services.
- Apply the same validation to every entry loaded from
--urls-file. - Add tests covering IPv4, IPv6, alternative numeric IP representations, DNS rebinding scenarios, and redirects from public hosts to private addresses.
- Run the Skill in a network sandbox that blocks access to internal and metadata networks unless such access is explicitly required.
