Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill openly documents account changes and payments that fit its school-lunch management purpose, with clear cautions about their risks.
This skill can change orders, remove students, alter subscriptions, and charge a saved card. Review each requested change and payment total. Write payloads are untested, and omitted fields can erase values. Enter credentials privately and protect downloaded student and transaction files. Both bundled files were inspected; live API behavior and the separate MCP server were not verified.
The code uses the expected service and shell tooling, but its primary action is an account-changing order submission. Although the description broadly says 'manage,' its concrete capabilities describe reading and checking data and do not disclose order creation. Editing quantities is only a comment; the actual executable behavior is fetching and submitting the order payload.
The POST to /payment/initCheckout initiates a checkout workflow. Although the description broadly says 'manage,' its listed payment capability is checking payments, not initiating checkout. This is an additional transactional capability. The snippet does not establish that payment is completed or funds are charged.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# The lunch calendar for a date range (POST, despite being a read).
# The fields are `start`/`end`. Using `startDate`/`endDate` returns 200 with an
# EMPTY events array — a silent wrong answer, not an error.
curl -sS -X POST "$MHLB/api/calendar/studentSchoolData" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $MHLB_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"start":"2026-09-01","end":"2026-09-30"}' | jq '.events[] | {studentId, id, start, className}'
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
mhlb_get '/event/createOrder?eventId=123&studentId=456' > order.json
# edit quantities in order.json
curl -sS -X POST "$MHLB/api/event/createOrder" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $MHLB_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d @order.json
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Lunch calendar for a range — a POST that reads
mhlb_post() {
local endpoint=$1; shift # NOT `path`: zsh ties $path to $PATH
curl -sS -X POST "$MHLB/api$endpoint" -H "Authorization: Bearer $MHLB_TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "${1:-{\}}"
}
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
mhlb_pdf() { # usage: mhlb_pdf <endpoint> <json> <out.pdf>
curl -sS -X POST "$MHLB/api$1" -H "Authorization: Bearer $MHLB_TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$2" -o "$3" && file "$3"
}