Incomplete referenced artifact analysis
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md line): `scripts/hf-token.mjs` decodes the cookie into `auth.json` and a one-line
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan marked this skill suspicious because its refresh instructions appear to go beyond reading data, and the executable script was only partially inspected.
Consider avoiding installation until the executable script can be fully inspected and the refresh-and-cookie-write workflow is clarified or removed. The verdict is suspicious, not malicious; the available scan is incomplete, so it does not establish that the skill is safe.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
line): `scripts/hf-token.mjs` decodes the cookie into `auth.json` and a one-line
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- `hf-token.mjs` exits `4` when the cookie holds no session (signed out) or a
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
`hf-token.mjs load` prints (to stderr) how many minutes the token has left. The
access token lives 30 minutes. When it has expired: **reload the hellofresh.com
tab** (the web app refreshes itself) and run the two lines above again. Only if
that doesn't help, refresh from the shell and write the new set back — the
refresh token ROTATES on every refresh, so skipping the write-back signs the
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
refresh was refused, `64` on bad usage.
- `fpx` exits `2` when the bridge is down or the tab/pairing is missing.
Never paste token values into chat, commits or issues. `rm ~/.hellofresh-fpx/{cookie.json,auth.json,auth.header,refreshed.json,cookie.txt,calc-*.json}` clears them.
Every recipe here was run live in both bash and zsh on 2026-11-12.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
const left = Math.round((set.issued_at + set.expires_in - Date.now() / 1000) / 60);
process.stderr.write(
left > 1
? `hf-token: access token valid for ${left} min\n`
: 'hf-token: access token expired — reload the hellofresh.com tab and run load again, or refresh (references/requests.md)\n',
);
}
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
process.stderr.write(
left > 1
? `hf-token: access token valid for ${left} min\n`
: 'hf-token: access token expired — reload the hellofresh.com tab and run load again, or refresh (references/requests.md)\n',
);
}
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
fork the session.
code=$(curl -sS -o "$S/refreshed.json" -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
'https://www.hellofresh.com/gw/refresh?country=us&locale=en-US' \
-H 'content-type: application/json' --data-binary @<(jq -c '{refresh_token}' "$S/auth.json"))
echo "refresh: HTTP $code" >&2
The manifest describes reading HelloFresh data using a session token read once from the signed-in tab. This recipe instead submits a refresh token to rotate credentials, stores the replacement credentials, and writes a new authentication cookie into the browser. This changes the user's authentication state rather than merely reading meal-kit data; the surrounding documentation explicitly warns that competing refreshers can disrupt the session.