T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:15- Finding
Installation from an Unpinned External Repository
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 15–17
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from a mutable, unverified source
Risk Level: MediumComplete Source Snippet:
text 설치 - pipx install . 또는 pip install . (레포 클론 후) - 저장소: https://github.com/ChloePark85/kakao-local-cliTechnical Analysis
The documentation instructs users to clone an external GitHub repository and install its current contents through
piporpipx. It does not specify an immutable commit hash, a versioned release artifact, cryptographic hashes, or signature verification. The project being audited contains onlySKILL.md, so the package source and installation behavior cannot be reviewed locally.Because the repository reference is mutable, the software installed by a user may differ from the content that existed at audit time. Python installation can execute attacker-controlled build backend or packaging logic. If the repository, maintainer account, or release process is compromised, malicious code could consequently execute during installation or later CLI invocation.
This finding establishes an insecure supply-chain installation path; it does not establish that the referenced repository currently contains malicious code.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, its maintainer account, or another mechanism controlling its default branch.
- The attacker adds malicious package source, build-system logic, or installation hooks.
- A user follows the documented instructions and clones the repository without selecting a reviewed immutable revision.
- The user executes
pip install .orpipx install .. - The Python packaging process builds or installs the attacker-controlled content.
- Malicious code executes with the privileges of the installing user, either during installation or when
kakao-localis invoked. - The code could access data available to that user, includi ...[truncated 723 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Include the complete, reviewable CLI source and dependency manifests in the skill package rather than relying solely on a mutable external repository.
- If external retrieval remains necessary, pin installation instructions to an immutable, reviewed commit hash or a specific release artifact.
- Publish cryptographic hashes for release artifacts and require users or installation automation to verify them before installation.
- Sign releases or commits and document signature verification using a trusted maintainer identity.
- Pin Python dependencies to reviewed versions and use hash-locked dependency files, such as a requirements file containing
--hashentries. - Use an isolated virtual environment or
pipxenvironment and explicitly advise against installation with administrator or root privileges. - Audit packaging files and build-system configuration for executable installation hooks before publishing each release.
- Add the reviewed version or commit identifier directly to
SKILL.mdso users cannot unintentionally install a later, unaudited repository state.
