T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:5- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unverified Python dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🎚️","requires":{"bins":["demucs"]},"install":[{"id":"pip","kind":"python","package":"demucs","bins":["demucs"],"label":"Install Demucs (pip)"}]}}Technical Analysis
The installation metadata instructs the host to install the
demucspackage through pip without specifying a reviewed version, dependency lockfile, package hashes, or a trusted package-index configuration. Consequently, the package version and its transitive dependency graph may change after the Skill has been reviewed.Python package installation can execute package build and installation logic. If the selected package release, a transitive dependency, or the configured package source is compromised, malicious code could run under the privileges of the process performing the installation. The finding does not establish that the current
demucspackage is malicious; it identifies an unsafe and mutable supply-chain boundary.Attack Path
- An operator or automated Skill installer processes the pip installation declaration.
- Pip queries its configured package index and resolves the currently available
demucsrelease and transitive dependencies. - Because no versions or hashes are enforced, the resolved artifacts can differ from those originally reviewed.
- An attacker who compromises an upstream release, transitive dependency, or package source supplies a malicious artifact.
- Pip downloads and installs that artifact, potentially executing attacker-controlled build or installation code.
- The malicious code runs with the installer process's privileges and can access resources available to that account.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide code execution with the privileges of the account or ser ...[truncated 440 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
demucsto an explicitly reviewed version rather than allowing installation of the latest available release. - Lock all transitive dependencies using a reproducible dependency file generated from reviewed artifacts.
- Require cryptographic hashes for every downloaded distribution, such as with pip's
--require-hashesmode. - Configure an explicitly trusted package index or an internally controlled artifact repository instead of relying on ambient pip configuration.
- Prefer prebuilt, reviewed wheels and reject unexpected source distributions where operationally possible.
- Install the dependency inside a dedicated virtual environment, container, or sandbox under a non-administrative account.
- Scan and periodically re-review pinned packages and transitive dependencies before updating the lockfile.
- Document an update process that validates package provenance, hashes, licenses, and security advisories before accepting a new version.
- Pin
