free quota text to image

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026 · 8:13 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill is a coherent text-to-image helper that uses external image providers as advertised, but users should treat prompts, tokens, and configured endpoints as privacy-sensitive.

Install only if you are comfortable sending image prompts to the configured providers. Avoid sensitive or proprietary prompt text, use trusted provider tokens and endpoints, leave openai_compatible disabled unless you control the endpoint, consider --no-optimize-prompt for privacy, and avoid running it from directories with unrelated sensitive .env files.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Taint Tracking: Direct Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (6)

Tainted flow: 'payload' from requests.post (line 475, network input) → requests.post (network output)

Medium

• Category: Data Flow

Content

}

    try:
        response = requests.post(generate_url, headers=headers, json=payload, timeout=timeout)
    except requests.RequestException as exc:
        raise ProviderRequestError(kind="network", message=f"OpenAI-compatible request failed: {exc}")

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: Unlike the fixed-provider endpoints, this request sends prompts and bearer tokens to a URL derived from provider_config.api_url, which may be externally configurable. If an attacker can influence that configuration, they can redirect requests and Authorization headers to an arbitrary host, causing credential exfiltration and unauthorized disclosure of user prompts.

Lp3

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs execution of a Python script that performs network requests, reads configuration files, writes output files, and may rely on environment-provided tokens, yet the skill declares no permissions or equivalent capability disclosure. This creates a transparency and governance gap: an agent or user may invoke the skill without realizing it can exfiltrate prompts to third-party providers, consume local secrets, or write files locally.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The skill documents sending prompts to multiple external image providers and saving files locally, but it does not warn users that their prompts may be transmitted to third parties or that local files may be created/overwritten. In a skill that emphasizes automatic provider routing and fallback, this is more dangerous because user data may be sent to several services during retries without explicit awareness.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: User prompt text is transmitted to external translation/optimization providers without any in-code indication of notice, consent, or sensitivity checks. In an agent skill, prompts often contain private user data, internal instructions, or proprietary content, so silent forwarding to third parties can create confidentiality and compliance risks.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 83% confidence
• Finding: The code transmits user prompts and bearer tokens to external providers without any mechanism in this file to surface consent, warning, or data-handling disclosure. In a multi-provider routing skill, that matters because prompts may contain sensitive information and the skill can silently send them to different third parties.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The script sends the user-supplied prompt to third-party providers via the generation workflow, but there is no explicit consent prompt or warning at the point of use. This can expose sensitive or proprietary text to external services, especially because the tool automatically routes across multiple providers and may also perform prompt optimization using provider-specific services.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.