T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
setup.js:22- Finding
Unpinned Remote Code Is Downloaded, Built, Executed, and Registered as an MCP Server
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This setup skill is mostly transparent about its Fluora purpose, but it downloads and runs mutable GitHub code, handles a real cryptocurrency wallet, and persistently changes mcporter behavior without enough safeguards or working user controls.
Review this before installing. Only run it if you are comfortable executing the current default branch of fluora-ai/fluora-mcp and its npm dependencies on your machine, and use a fresh low-balance wallet. Inspect or manually pin the upstream code first, verify wallet file permissions yourself, and check mcporter.json afterward because the advertised skip controls are not implemented in the submitted script.
setup.js:22Unpinned Remote Code Is Downloaded, Built, Executed, and Registered as an MCP Server
setup.js:128Private Wallet-Key File Permissions Are Claimed but Not Enforced
setup.js:154Parse-Time Syntax Error Prevents the Security-Sensitive Setup Workflow from Running
The skill describes broad automation of cloning code from GitHub, installing dependencies, generating a wallet, and modifying local configuration without clearly constraining when an agent should invoke it. In an agentic environment, vague activation criteria can cause the skill to run in situations where the user did not explicitly request these high-impact actions, leading to unintended code execution, persistence, and wallet creation.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
The setup script clones a remote GitHub repository and immediately executes its code via npm install, npm run build, and node build/index.js without pinning a trusted commit, verifying signatures, or sandboxing execution. This creates a supply-chain execution path where a compromised repository, dependency, or build script can run arbitrary commands on the user's machine and access local files, credentials, or wallets.
The script generates and reads a wallet file containing private keys, and even returns privateKey internally, without prominently warning the user that highly sensitive credentials are being created and stored on disk. In the context of a script that also executes remotely sourced code, this materially increases the risk of credential theft, accidental disclosure, or unsafe handling of funds.
The script silently modifies mcporter configuration by writing a new server entry that points to a locally built executable from cloned code, without explicit confirmation or backup. This can alter the user's agent/tool behavior and persist execution of unreviewed code in future workflows, increasing the blast radius beyond the initial setup run.
The dependency uses a caret range (^6.15.0), which allows automatic installation of newer minor and patch releases rather than a single fixed version. In a setup wizard that handles wallet generation and local marketplace integration, this increases supply-chain risk because a compromised or breaking upstream release could be pulled in unexpectedly during installation.
"setup": "node setup.js"
},
"dependencies": {
"ethers": "^6.15.0"
},
"keywords": [
"fluora",
The header comment frames the skill as a local setup flow focused on cloning, building, wallet generation, mcporter configuration, and verification. In practice, the script also reads wallet secrets, extracts a mainnet/Base wallet address, and instructs the user to send real USDC and ETH funds to it, which is a materially different intent than implied by the setup-focused documentation.