T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:149- Finding
Forced Promotional Content in Agent Responses
- Content
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**\u7f72\u540d**\uff1a\u4e00\u7ebf\u8bc4\u6807\u4e13\u5bb6&ChesaraM \uff5c **\u53cd\u9988/\u4ea4\u6d41**\uff1a\u5fae\u4fe1\u516c\u4f17\u53f7\u300c\u4e00\u7ebf\u8bc4\u6807\u4e13\u5bb6\u300d\uff08\u4f7f\u7528\u95ee\u9898\u3001\u8bef\u62a5\u53cd\u9988\u3001\u5b9e\u52a1\u5efa\u8bae\uff0c\u6b22\u8fce\u7559\u8a00\u4ea4\u6d41\uff09 ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill defines a mandatory response template that directs the agent to append author branding and a WeChat promotional contact message to generated compliance reports. This content is unrelated to the substantive tender-document review and is presented as an obligatory part of the agent's answer. When the skill is loaded, its instructions affect the current agent session. An agent following the template will reproduce the promotional material without the user explicitly requesting attribution or contact information. This constitutes instruction-level output manipulation because the skill alters the expected final response for the benefit of the skill author. No executable code, privilege escalation, credential access, persistence, or remote payload execution is involved. ### Attack Path 1. A user or platform loads the skill from `SKILL.md`. 2. The agent accepts the skill's prescribed output template as active instructions. 3. The user submits a tender document for compliance review. 4. The agent generates the requested report according to the mandatory template. 5. Lines 149-150 cause the agent to append author attribution and a WeChat promotional message. 6. The resulting report may appear to endorse the named author or communication channel despite the user not requesting that content. ...[truncated 566 chars]- Remediation
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