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Security audit

Interview Prep

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a coherent interview-prep purpose, but it needs review because it reads private email/tracker data and writes sensitive interview codes and contacts to disk with under-scoped safeguards.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the skill read interview-related Gmail, Notion, tracker, profile, and local note data. Before using it, confirm the exact output path, avoid untrusted company-name input, and do not let it save access codes, meeting links, or personal contact emails unless you explicitly want that information stored in plaintext.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:87
Finding

Path Traversal Through Unsanitized Company Slug

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:129
Finding

SQL Injection Through Interpolated Company Name

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:94
Finding

Sensitive Interview Credentials Persisted in Plaintext

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill description advertises cross-system data access to Gmail, Notion, and local notes, but provides no explicit privacy warning, consent boundary, or minimization guidance before collecting and consolidating interview-related personal data. That increases the risk of users triggering the skill without understanding that private emails, contact details, and scheduling information will be accessed and copied into a local document.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
Trigger when the user asks to:

- Prepare for an upcoming interview ("prep notes for [Company] interview", "create interview prep for [Company]")
- Generate a prep document for a scheduled interview
- Update or add to an existing prep doc for a company
- Research a company before an interview

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to fetch Gmail threads and extract sensitive details such as access codes, contact identities, interview times, and ATS links, then merge them into a consolidated prep document by default. Centralizing these secrets and personal details in a local markdown file materially increases exposure risk through local compromise, accidental sharing, indexing, backups, or later model access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to create directories and write or update files in a fixed local path, including merge behavior, without an explicit warning or confirmation step for filesystem modification. This can lead to unintended persistence of sensitive interview data, accidental overwrites, or changes to existing notes the user did not expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The output template explicitly requires inclusion of access codes, contact emails, and day-of logistics pulled from emails, which operationalizes persistence of sensitive secrets and personal data in the final artifact. Because the file is stored in a predictable local project directory, the context makes this more dangerous by creating a durable, discoverable repository of interview credentials and contact information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.