T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Permit Unreviewed Package Installation
- Content
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=1.1.0 av>=12.0.0 opencc-python-reimplemented>=0.1.7 ``` `_meta.json:8-10`: ```json "faster-whisper": ">=1.1.0", "av": ">=12.0.0", "opencc-python-reimplemented": ">=0.1.7" ``` `SKILL.md:81` instructs users to install these dependencies: ```bash python -m pip install -r requirements.txt ``` ### Technical Analysis Every dependency uses an open-ended minimum-version constraint. No lockfile, exact version constraint, package hash, or restricted package source is provided. Consequently, the installation command can resolve to dependency versions that were never reviewed with this project. Python package installation may execute package build or installation logic, while imported dependencies execute code with the privileges of the user running the skill. If a permitted upstream package release or configured package index is compromised, the effective code installed and executed by this project can change without any modification to the audited repository. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently named packages are malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises an upstream dependency release, its publishing account, or a package index used by the victim. 2. The attacker publishes a newer package version satisfying one of the open-ended `>=` constraints. 3. A user follows the installation command in `SKILL.md`. 4. Pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release because no exact version or trusted hash is required. 5. Malicious package installation logic or imported runtime code executes with the permissions of the user running pip or the transcription script. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code under the ...[truncated 426 chars]- Remediation
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