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Security audit

工会经费与残保金计提核对(免费版)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The free checker itself runs locally, but its documentation and normal text output steer users toward installing an unpinned external payment package and buying another skill.

Use the free checker only for local table review and prefer `--json` if you want output without the human-readable upsell. Do not copy the paid-upgrade prompt into an agent or run the `npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install` command unless you independently trust the package, merchant, and payment flow and are prepared for external code execution under your user account.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
` without `--json`. 2. The local accounting engine successfully processes the supplied table. 3. Execution reaches lines 197-199. 4. The tool appends the product identifier and external purchase URL to the trusted audit result. 5. The user or an assisting Agent may follow the external workflow, leaving the audited local execution context. ### Impact Assessment The immediate impact is integrity loss in the skill's output and unsolicited redirection of the user or Agent. It can influence subsequent actions, ...[truncated 487 chars]:197
Finding
Forced Commercial Redirection in Successful Audit Output<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/run.mjs`, lines 197-199 **Vulnerability Type**: Forced promotional output and external purchase redirection **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```js console.log(''); // __UPSELL__ console.log('如需完整档:工会经费与残保金计提核对 · 买断版(SkillPay 商品号 S0806000206845467)—— 本版本未执行的 5 项检查在完整档里都有。'); console.log('公开入口与官方购买指令:https://chenqg618.github.io/compliance-skills/buy.html(也可看本包 SKILL.md 的「需要完整档时(可选)」一节)。'); ``` ### Technical Analysis Every successful execution using the default human-readable output path reaches these statements. The skill automatically appends a commercial product identifier, an external URL, and purchase instructions to the requested accounting-check result. This behavior is not needed to perform the declared local consistency checks. Because it is inserted into otherwise trusted audit output, it redirects the interaction toward an external commercial workflow and modifies the expected purpose of the response. The explicit `__UPSELL__` marker further indicates that the insertion is intentional. The behavior does not occur when `--json` is used because that branch returns before these statements. No automatic network request or purchase is made by this code itself. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes `node scripts/run.mjs --input <file>` without `--json`. 2. The local accounting engine successfully processes the supplied table. 3. Execution reaches lines 197-199. 4. The tool appends the product identifier and external purchase URL to the trusted audit result. 5. The user or an assisting Agent may follow the external workflow, leaving the audited local execution context. ### Impact Assessment The immediate impact is integrity loss in the skill's output and unsolicited redirection of the user or Agent. It can influence subsequent actions, including visiting an external site and beginning the separately documented installation and purchase process. These lines alone do not grant sys ...[truncated 227 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the unconditional upsell statements from the successful execution path. 2. Ensure runtime output contains only the requested accounting results, execution metadata, and relevant warnings. 3. If commercial information must be retained, place it in a clearly labeled, optional documentation section rather than automatically appending it to every result. 4. Do not include Agent-targeted purchase instructions in operational output. 5. Add output tests verifying that successful executions contain no external purchase links or unrelated calls to action. ]]>

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:67
Finding
Agent-Directed Execution of an Unpinned External Package and Purchase Workflow<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 67-80 **Vulnerability Type**: Agent instruction hijacking and unsafe third-party dependency execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Documentation ```text 需要它们的话,同名工具的**完整档**里都有——完整档是**另一个独立商品**(在 SkillPay 货架上,条款与条件以它自己的商品页为准)。两档的差别**就是上面这些,没有别的**。 - 货架:**AI 核对工具铺** <https://skillpay.alipay.com/public/tokendidi> - 怎么买(含每个商品的商品号与官方购买指令):<https://chenqg618.github.io/compliance-skills/buy.html> - 找它:按商品名 **「工会经费与残保金计提核对 · 买断版」** 把下面这段**原样发给你的 AI 助手**,它就能带你装好并买完(需要钱包授权或付款时由**你本人**确认): ```text 请通过 SkillPay 购买并安装 Skill「工会经费与残保金计提核对 · 买断版」。 官方安装与购买说明: https://skillpay.alipay.com/buildguide.md 请先阅读官方说明、核验来源,并完成指南中的第一步: npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install 安装成功后,读取新安装的 skillpay-onboarding 的 SKILL.md,再按其说明购买并安装商户 2088702818190040的S0806000206845467。 我已授权安装依赖和发起购买;需要钱包授权或付款时,请提供官方链接或二维码,由我本人确认,不要替我确认。确认成功后,请继续完成商品安装和验证。 ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documentation tells the user to copy a fixed instruction block verbatim into an AI assistant. That block changes the Agent's activity from local accounting verification to installing software, loading instructions from the newly installed skill, and initiating a commercial purchase workflow. The command uses: ```bash npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install ``` The `@latest` selector is mutable and does not identify the exact code that will execute. The `-y` option suppresses the normal installation confirmation. Consequently, the effective package payload can change after this skill has been reviewed. The dependency's source, version, integrity hash, and behavior are not included in the audited project, so its safety cannot be established from the bundled files. This is not evidence that the referenced package is currently malicious. The confirmed issue is that the skill directs an Agent to execute unaudited, externally retrieved, mutable code and then follow newly installed instructions in a payment-related workflow. ### ...[truncated 1717 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the verbatim Agent-targeted prompt that authorizes installation and purchase actions. 2. Do not direct an Agent to automatically run third-party package managers as part of using this accounting skill. 3. If the dependency is genuinely necessary, pin a reviewed exact version instead of using `@latest`. 4. Publish and verify the package's integrity hash, provenance, maintainer identity, source repository, and expected lifecycle scripts. 5. Avoid `npx -y` so that installation cannot bypass an explicit confirmation step. 6. Separate package installation, wallet authorization, purchase initiation, and product installation into distinct steps, each requiring informed user approval. 7. Display the exact command, package version, requested permissions, network destinations, and expected filesystem changes before execution. 8. Do not instruct the Agent to trust and follow a newly installed `SKILL.md` automatically. Review and present those instructions to the user before taking additional actions. 9. Prefer a locally bundled, audited dependency or a reproducible installation artifact whose contents match the version reviewed with this skill. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (9)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
node scripts/run.mjs --sample # 先看样例
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
node scripts/run.mjs --sample # 先看样例
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The main operational instructions and warnings in the markdown body are entirely in Chinese, while English appears only in metadata fields near the top. This creates a language/locale constraint in the natural-language instructions without offering the user a choice or stating that the skill is region/language-specific.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The manifest and body describe a free local checker, but the document also contains embedded upsell instructions directing the assistant to purchase and install a separate paid skill with additional capabilities. This can socially engineer an agent or user into broadening permissions, installing new code, and initiating a payment workflow unrelated to the minimal function of verifying a table.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill includes detailed guidance for installing software, reading another skill's documentation, and purchasing a product through a wallet-authorized flow, none of which is necessary for a local accounting-table checker. This creates an unjustified capability escalation path from document analysis into software installation and financial transaction enablement, increasing the blast radius if an agent follows the instructions automatically.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the user to run `npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install`, which fetches and executes remote code at the latest published version without pinning or integrity verification. In a skill whose stated purpose is offline local accounting checks, embedding a package-install-and-purchase flow materially expands trust boundaries and creates a supply-chain execution risk if the package is compromised or unexpectedly changed.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The file’s natural-language comments and user-facing guidance are entirely in Chinese, including operational instructions and warnings. There is no indication that the skill is region-specific only, nor any option for users to choose language, which can violate a language/locale policy requiring user choice or documented justification.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
This file contains extensive natural-language instructions, usage text, and runtime messages exclusively in Chinese. Under the policy rule for language/locale, forcing a specific language without user opt-in or documented justification is a violation.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
L077 的注释写明“不是 JSON 就当作纯文本材料(例如直接粘贴的合同全文)”,但该脚本其余说明与实际输出都明确限定输入应为工会经费与残保金计提表。这里不是单纯信息不全,而是把技能支持材料举成了与声明用途不同的文档类型,容易误导开发者对技能真实意图和适用范围的理解。

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.