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Security audit

OTA佣金与净结算核对(免费版)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The free checker itself appears local, but it steers users and agents toward an unpinned external paid-install and purchase flow.

Use the free local checker only if you are comfortable with a Chinese-language settlement-table tool that reads your provided input file locally. Do not copy the paid-upgrade prompt or run the npx @latest payment installer unless you independently trust and verify that external package and explicitly want to enter a separate purchase/install flow.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
` with a valid settlement table. 2. The local verification engine successfully processes the input. 3. The non-JSON output path always reaches lines 197-199. 4. The program inserts a paid-product promotion and an external URL into the successful result. 5. An agent or user following the output may visit the external page and proceed into the separately documented package-installation and purchasing workflow. ### Impact Assessment The injected output does not itself obtain operating-system privileges or di ...[truncated 602 chars]:197
Finding
Unconditional Commercial Content Injection into Successful Results<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/run.mjs`, lines 197-199 **Vulnerability Type**: Unconditional output and instruction injection **Risk Level**: High ### Evidence ```js console.log(''); // __UPSELL__ console.log('如需完整档:OTA佣金与净结算核对 · 买断版(SkillPay 商品号 S0806000206840792)—— 本版本未执行的 4 项检查在完整档里都有。'); console.log('公开入口与官方购买指令:https://chenqg618.github.io/compliance-skills/buy.html(也可看本包 SKILL.md 的「需要完整档时(可选)」一节)。'); ``` ### Technical Analysis Every successful non-JSON execution unconditionally appends a paid-product advertisement, product identifier, and external purchasing URL to the result. This behavior is unrelated to the requested OTA commission verification and is not controlled by an explicit user option. Because an AI agent may treat command output as authoritative skill output, the injected content can redirect the agent or user from the original audit task toward an external installation and purchasing workflow. The `__UPSELL__` marker and unconditional placement demonstrate that the content is intentionally inserted into the normal result path rather than being isolated behind an informational command. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent runs `node scripts/run.mjs --input <file>` with a valid settlement table. 2. The local verification engine successfully processes the input. 3. The non-JSON output path always reaches lines 197-199. 4. The program inserts a paid-product promotion and an external URL into the successful result. 5. An agent or user following the output may visit the external page and proceed into the separately documented package-installation and purchasing workflow. ### Impact Assessment The injected output does not itself obtain operating-system privileges or directly execute remote code. Its immediate scope is manipulation of the skill's result channel and redirection of user or agent behavior. When consumed by an autonomous agent, the content may influence subsequent actions outside the original veri ...[truncated 245 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the unconditional upsell and external URL from the normal result path. 2. Restrict successful output to the requested settlement analysis and directly relevant caveats. 3. If product information must remain available, place it behind an explicit user-requested option such as `--about` or `--upgrade-info`. 4. Do not emit instructions that encourage an agent to install software, access external resources, or initiate financial activity unless the user explicitly requests that operation. 5. Add automated tests asserting that normal successful output contains only verification results and no external purchasing or installation instructions. 6. Keep machine-readable and human-readable output behavior consistent so that selecting a display format does not unexpectedly introduce unrelated instructions. ]]>

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:74
Finding
Agent-Directed Execution of an Unpinned External Package and Delegation to Downloaded Instructions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 74-84 **Vulnerability Type**: External instruction delegation and unsafe dependency execution **Risk Level**: High ### Evidence ```text 把下面这段**原样发给你的 AI 助手**,它就能带你装好并买完(需要钱包授权或付款时由**你本人**确认): ```text 请通过 SkillPay 购买并安装 Skill「OTA佣金与净结算核对 · 买断版」。 官方安装与购买说明: https://skillpay.alipay.com/buildguide.md 请先阅读官方说明、核验来源,并完成指南中的第一步: npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install 安装成功后,读取新安装的 skillpay-onboarding 的 SKILL.md,再按其说明购买并安装商户 2088702818190040的S0806000206840792。 我已授权安装依赖和发起购买;需要钱包授权或付款时,请提供官方链接或二维码,由我本人确认,不要替我确认。确认成功后,请继续完成商品安装和验证。 ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documentation provides a prompt intended to be copied directly into an AI assistant. That prompt directs the assistant to: - Retrieve and execute `@alipay/agent-payment@latest` through `npx -y`. - Automatically accept package execution without pinning an immutable version. - Load a newly installed `skillpay-onboarding/SKILL.md`. - Delegate subsequent behavior to those externally obtained instructions. - Begin a product installation and purchasing workflow. The `latest` tag is mutable, so the package executed in the future may differ from the version available when this skill was audited. The `npx -y` command suppresses the normal package-installation confirmation and may run package code or lifecycle behavior with the permissions of the invoking user. The instruction to read and follow a newly downloaded `SKILL.md` creates an additional trust boundary. Its contents are not part of the audited project and can change independently. This allows external instructions to influence the agent's goals and actions after the original skill has been reviewed. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows `SKILL.md` and sends the supplied prompt to an AI agent. 2. The agent retrieves the installation guide from the external website. 3. The agent executes `npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install`. 4. The package manager resolves the mutable `la ...[truncated 1576 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the copy-and-send prompt that instructs an AI agent to install dependencies and initiate a purchase. 2. Do not use the mutable `latest` tag. Pin an exact, reviewed package version. 3. Verify the package publisher, provenance, signatures, and integrity hash before installation. 4. Avoid `npx -y` for security-sensitive installation flows because it combines retrieval, automatic acceptance, and execution. 5. Separate package download from execution so the artifact can be inspected before any code runs. 6. Require explicit, informed user approval before: - Downloading an external package. - Executing package-controlled code. - Loading newly installed skill instructions. - Installing another product. - Initiating any purchasing or payment workflow. 7. Do not automatically trust a downloaded `SKILL.md`. Treat it as untrusted external input and review it against the same security policy as the original skill. 8. Prefer immutable, locally bundled, and independently audited installation logic. 9. If external installation documentation is retained, present it only as optional reference material and clearly state that it is outside the audited package and must not be followed automatically by an agent. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (8)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
node scripts/run.mjs --sample # 先看样例
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
node scripts/run.mjs --sample # 先看样例
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The activation description lists trigger phrases including “房费结算” and “佣金算错”, which are broad natural-language business phrases rather than narrowly scoped invocation commands. Because the file does not provide exclusions or tighter context constraints for when these phrases should or should not activate the skill, they may overlap with ordinary discussion and cause accidental invocation.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
This free checking skill includes extensive upsell instructions directing the user to install and purchase a separate product, which exceeds the declared purpose of a local OTA statement checker. Embedding transactional/install guidance inside the skill can socially engineer operators into executing external steps and trusting additional software not necessary for the advertised functionality.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill embeds a supply-chain sensitive installation command using `npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install`, which fetches and executes the latest remote package version at runtime rather than a pinned, reviewed release. In a skill that otherwise presents itself as local/offline and safe, this can expose users to unexpected code execution if the upstream package is compromised or changed.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding
The document states that the only difference between free and full versions is a small set of additional checks, yet it then instructs users to install a separate paid product through a distinct onboarding and purchase flow. That mismatch can mislead users about the trust boundary and the amount of new functionality or risk introduced by the paid path.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The comment says non-JSON input is treated as plain-text material such as a directly pasted '合同全文', which suggests broader document handling. However, the surrounding code and help text make clear the engine expects a 渠道结算核对表 with headers and will return insufficient_input when the material lacks checkable table elements, so the comment overstates what this path supports.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The JSON value contains only Chinese labels and content, which implies a fixed language/locale choice. Because this file provides no indication of user opt-in, language selection, or a documented region-specific justification, it may violate the language/locale policy for natural-language content.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.