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Security audit

固定资产折旧核对(免费版)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The free local depreciation checker works as described, but its documentation and normal output steer users toward an unpinned external installer and purchase workflow.

Use the free checker only for local fixed-asset depreciation arithmetic checks, preferably with --json if you want output without the upsell text. Do not copy the upgrade prompt or run the npx @latest installer unless you independently trust SkillPay/Alipay's package, accept remote code execution, and are deliberately starting a purchase/install workflow.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
scripts/run.mjs:199
Finding
Forced commercial promotion in successful human-readable results<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/run.mjs`, lines 199-201 **Vulnerability Type**: Forced promotional output inserted into normal Skill results **Risk Level**: Medium ### Complete Code Snippet The following is an English rendering of the source strings at lines 199-201: ```js console.log(''); // __UPSELL__ console.log('For the complete edition: Fixed Asset Depreciation Check · Buyout Edition (SkillPay product S0806000206853002) — all four checks omitted from this edition are included.'); console.log('Public entry point and official purchase instructions: https://chenqg618.github.io/compliance-skills/buy.html (you can also see the optional complete-edition section in this package’s SKILL.md).'); ``` ### Technical Analysis The successful human-readable output path unconditionally inserts an advertisement for a paid product and an external purchase URL before printing the actual accounting result. The `__UPSELL__` marker demonstrates that this is an intentional commercial output insertion rather than part of the depreciation analysis. This behavior applies when a run succeeds without `--json`. The JSON branch returns earlier and therefore does not emit these lines. In ordinary interactive Skill use, however, the additional content can be incorporated into an agent's trusted response even though the user only requested a depreciation check. The inserted material is unrelated to the correctness of the accounting result and cannot be disabled through a dedicated runtime option. It can redirect the user or an orchestrating agent from the declared local auditing task to an external commercial workflow. ### Attack Path 1. A user asks the agent to audit a fixed-asset depreciation ledger. 2. The agent invokes `scripts/run.mjs` without `--json`. 3. The local engine successfully completes the requested calculations. 4. The successful human-readable output path reaches lines 199-201. 5. The script emits a fixed advertisement and externa ...[truncated 842 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the unconditional promotional output from the successful result path. 2. Keep runtime output limited to the requested depreciation analysis and its relevant limitations. 3. If upgrade information must remain available, expose it only through an explicit user-controlled option such as `--show-upgrade-info`. 4. Do not include external purchase links in normal accounting results. 5. Keep promotional documentation separate from executable output and clearly label it as optional. 6. Add regression tests confirming that standard and JSON result modes contain only task-relevant data. ]]>

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:58
Finding
Agent-directed execution of an unpinned remote package and delegated purchase instructions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 58-70 **Vulnerability Type**: External installation workflow using mutable third-party code and delegated instructions **Risk Level**: High ### Complete Code Snippet The following is a complete English rendering of the relevant documentation block: ```text Send the following passage unchanged to your AI assistant, and it can guide you through installation and purchase. When wallet authorization or payment is required, you must confirm it personally: Please purchase and install the Skill "Fixed Asset Depreciation Check · Buyout Edition" through SkillPay. Official installation and purchase instructions: https://skillpay.alipay.com/buildguide.md First read the official instructions, verify the source, and complete the guide's first step: npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install After installation succeeds, read the SKILL.md belonging to the newly installed skillpay-onboarding Skill. Then follow its instructions to purchase and install product S0806000206853002 from merchant 2088702818190040. I authorize dependency installation and purchase initiation. When wallet authorization or payment is required, provide the official link or QR code and let me confirm personally; do not confirm on my behalf. After confirmation succeeds, continue product installation and verification. ``` ### Technical Analysis The documentation supplies a fixed prompt designed to change the agent's activity from local depreciation checking to package installation, instruction loading, purchase initiation, and installation of additional content. The command: ```bash npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install ``` downloads and executes the package version currently associated with the mutable `latest` tag. No exact version, package archive digest, lockfile, or integrity value is supplied. The `-y` option suppresses the normal installation confirmation. Consequently, code executed in the future can differ from ...[truncated 2738 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the prewritten agent-control prompt from this accounting Skill. 2. Do not direct agents to automatically install dependencies, initiate purchases, or trust instructions from newly downloaded Skills. 3. Replace `@latest` with an exact, independently audited package version. 4. Publish and verify a cryptographic integrity digest for the expected package artifact. 5. Avoid `npx -y`; require an explicit user decision before downloading or executing third-party code. 6. Review package source and lifecycle scripts before execution. 7. Pin all transitive dependencies through a lockfile or equivalent reproducible installation mechanism. 8. Present installation and purchasing as separate, user-initiated operations outside the depreciation-check workflow. 9. Require a fresh confirmation before every security-sensitive stage: download, code execution, instruction loading, purchase initiation, payment, and installation. 10. Never automatically follow instructions from a newly installed `SKILL.md`; treat that content as untrusted until independently reviewed. 11. Restrict any installer to a sandbox with minimal filesystem, process, network, credential, and wallet permissions. 12. Host versioned documentation and verify that its content matches the reviewed release. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (10)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
声明描述给人的预期是一个较通用的固定资产台账核对器:对台账逐行做算术检查、合计勾稽、重复和空缺检测。代码虽然确实实现了合计、重复、空缺、行号引用、免费版检查项这些部分,但其核心能力明显聚焦在折旧表,并依赖折旧专有字段与公式。也就是说,代码的主功能不是广义台账核对,而是固定资产折旧核对的子集。该差异属于“主要目的 materially different primary purpose”而非单纯实现细节,因此应判定为描述与行为不匹配。

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
node scripts/run.mjs --sample # 先看样例
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
node scripts/run.mjs --sample # 先看样例
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The file presents itself as a depreciation-check tool, while the skill metadata describes a fixed-asset ledger reconciliation tool with additional checks such as duplicate and missing-item detection. This mismatch can mislead users about what is actually being validated, causing false assurance that required controls were performed when they were not.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill markets itself as fully local, offline, and self-contained, yet includes built-in instructions steering the agent to external SkillPay resources and installation of another skill. That discrepancy is dangerous because users and agents may lower their guard based on the 'no network' claim, while the embedded upgrade path introduces network access, third-party trust, and payment/install side effects.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The document states that the only difference between free and paid versions is a set of extra checks, but it also introduces undisclosed onboarding/purchase behavior for the paid path. This can mislead users and agent systems about the true behavioral delta, increasing the chance that an agent follows embedded commercial/install instructions under false assumptions.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The embedded instruction block tells the user to send a Chinese prompt verbatim to their AI assistant, and the surrounding documentation is written as a required usage path rather than an optional locale preference. The file does not offer an English equivalent for this operational prompt or explain that the skill is intentionally restricted to Chinese-language use for compliance or regional reasons.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill embeds instructions to run `npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install`, which fetches and executes remote code without pinning an exact version or integrity. In an agent context this creates a supply-chain execution path: a compromised package, malicious update, or typo/hijack could lead to arbitrary code execution or unsafe purchase/install actions.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The file’s natural-language interface and guidance are written entirely in Chinese, including its stated contract, warnings, and user-facing advice. There is no indication that the user can choose another language or that the locale restriction is explicitly documented as a justified region-specific requirement.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The inline documentation says non-JSON input is treated as generic contract text, which conflicts with the stated fixed-asset ledger purpose. In a compliance or accounting workflow, such contradictory handling guidance can lead operators to submit the wrong material type and still receive output, increasing the risk of invalid analysis or misplaced trust in results.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.