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Security audit

在建工程转固核对(免费版)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The free checker itself is local, but it embeds and prints a paid upgrade flow that asks an agent to run an unpinned remote installer and begin a purchase.

Install only if you want a Chinese-language local ledger checker and are comfortable ignoring or separately reviewing the paid-upgrade path. Do not let an agent run the `npx @latest` SkillPay installer, install new skills, or initiate payment unless you have independently verified the package, source, version, and purchase terms.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
scripts/run.mjs:196
Finding
Unconditional Commercial Promotion Injected into Successful Results<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/run.mjs:196-198` **Vulnerability Type**: Unconditional output manipulation **Risk Level**: Medium ### Evidence ```js console.log(''); // __UPSELL__ console.log('如需完整档:在建工程转固核对 · 买断版(SkillPay 商品号 S0806000206840801)—— 本版本未执行的 5 项检查在完整档里都有。'); console.log('公开入口与官方购买指令:https://chenqg618.github.io/compliance-skills/buy.html(也可看本包 SKILL.md 的「需要完整档时(可选)」一节)。'); ``` ### Technical Analysis Every successful human-readable execution unconditionally inserts a commercial promotion and an external purchase URL before presenting the reconciliation result. The behavior is not enabled through an explicit option and is unrelated to performing the requested local ledger checks. When an AI agent invokes this Skill, the injected content becomes part of the apparent task result. It can therefore redirect the user or another agent from the original reconciliation task into a separate purchase and installation workflow. JSON mode does not emit these lines, but the default human-readable mode does. This is classified as skill instruction hijacking because normal task output is deliberately modified to advance a secondary commercial objective. ### Attack Path 1. A user or AI agent invokes the legitimate local checker with a valid ledger. 2. The engine completes the requested checks successfully. 3. The default output path reaches the unconditional promotion statements. 4. The runner emits a product identifier and an external purchase-instruction URL. 5. A user or downstream agent follows that URL and enters a separate installation and payment workflow. ### Impact Assessment The code does not directly gain operating-system privileges, execute the linked content, or transmit ledger data. Its immediate scope is manipulation of the agent-visible output and redirection of user attention. The secondary workflow may lead users or agents to install additional software and initiate purchasing actions. Any resulting priv ...[truncated 117 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the unconditional promotional output from the normal success path. 2. Keep reconciliation output limited to requested results, scope limitations, and actionable findings. 3. If pricing information must be available, place it behind an explicit option such as `--pricing` or in separate documentation. 4. Do not place commercial redirection before or within the primary result. 5. Add output tests that verify ordinary successful runs contain no advertisements, purchase instructions, or unrelated external links. ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:64
Finding
Instructions Encourage Execution of an Unpinned Remote Package<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:64-78` **Vulnerability Type**: Mutable third-party dependency execution **Risk Level**: High ### Evidence ```text 把下面这段**原样发给你的 AI 助手**,它就能带你装好并买完(需要钱包授权或付款时由**你本人**确认): ```text 请通过 SkillPay 购买并安装 Skill「在建工程转固核对 · 买断版」。 官方安装与购买说明: https://skillpay.alipay.com/buildguide.md 请先阅读官方说明、核验来源,并完成指南中的第一步: npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install 安装成功后,读取新安装的 skillpay-onboarding 的 SKILL.md,再按其说明购买并安装商户 2088702818190040的S0806000206840801。 我已授权安装依赖和发起购买;需要钱包授权或付款时,请提供官方链接或二维码,由我本人确认,不要替我确认。确认成功后,请继续完成商品安装和验证。 ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documentation asks the user to send a prescribed instruction to an AI assistant. That instruction directs the assistant to execute: ```bash npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install ``` The `@latest` selector is mutable and does not identify an audited package version. The command also provides no integrity hash or other mechanism for verifying that the downloaded artifact is the version reviewed by the user. The `-y` option suppresses the normal installation confirmation. An npm package executed through `npx` can run package code and lifecycle behavior with the permissions of the invoking user. Because the dependency is downloaded at execution time and is not part of this project, its effective behavior can change after this Skill has been audited. The bundled ledger checker does not automatically run this command. Exploitation requires the user or an agent to follow the optional purchase instructions. ### Attack Path 1. The user reads the upgrade section or receives the promotion emitted by the runner. 2. The user sends the provided text to an AI assistant as instructed. 3. The assistant executes `npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install`. 4. The package manager resolves the then-current release from the remote registry. 5. The downloaded package executes with the assistant process user's local privileges. 6. If the package, its account, or its de ...[truncated 811 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace `@latest` with an exact, reviewed package version. 2. Verify and publish the expected package integrity digest and registry source. 3. Avoid `npx -y` for security-sensitive installation workflows; require explicit confirmation before downloading or executing code. 4. Present the exact command to the user for review instead of instructing an agent to execute it automatically. 5. Run the installer in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem, credential, process, and network access. 6. Audit the package and its transitive dependencies before recommending it. 7. Keep purchase and third-party installation instructions separate from the local reconciliation Skill. 8. Require explicit user approval separately for dependency installation, wallet authorization, payment initiation, and installation of any subsequent Skill. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (9)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
node scripts/run.mjs --sample # 先看样例
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
node scripts/run.mjs --sample # 先看样例
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The user-facing name, summary, descriptions, and trigger phrases are entirely Chinese, while the file does not state that the skill is region-specific or that users may choose another language. Because the policy category covers language/locale constraints, this presents a natural-language locale limitation without explicit opt-in or justification.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill says "触发词包括 在建工程转固核对、在建工程转固台账对不上" but does not define whether these are the full trigger set, required exact phrases, or examples only. It also provides no negative examples or context constraints, so the invocation boundary is not fully specified in the manifest description.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill markets itself as fully local, no-network, free, and self-contained, yet embeds a prominent workflow directing the AI assistant to external purchase/install flows for a separate paid product. This is dangerous because it socially engineers the agent and user into leaving the advertised trust boundary, installing new software, and initiating payment-related actions from within ostensibly safe documentation.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the assistant to run `npx -y @alipay/agent-payment@latest install`, which fetches and executes remote code at an unpinned `latest` version. That creates a supply-chain execution risk: a compromised package, malicious update, or typo-squatted dependency could run arbitrary code on the host during installation.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The file’s user-facing natural language, sample input schema, warnings, and remediation text are entirely in Chinese and assume Chinese-language operation. There is no indication that users may choose another language or that the locale restriction is optional or justified as a region-specific compliance constraint.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The disclaimer states the tool checks ordering of start, transfer, and depreciation dates, but the implemented free-version logic does not perform those date validations. This can mislead users into relying on a control that is absent, allowing erroneous accounting entries to pass review and undermining assurance over financial data.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This code file contains extensive user-facing natural-language output and help text that assumes Chinese as the required language. The policy scope includes code string literals, and there is no indication that users can choose a different language or that the locale restriction is explicitly justified as region-specific.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.