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Security audit

Claude Code Delegate

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill openly delegates coding to Claude Code, but its default setup can give a background coding agent broad filesystem power without mandatory guardrails.

Install only if you intentionally want an OpenClaw agent to hand coding tasks to a local Claude Code CLI. Before use, set up an enforceable write-guard or path allowlist, run it only inside an isolated project directory, avoid repositories containing secrets, and treat session resume as project-specific rather than reusable across unrelated work.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill auto-triggers on extremely broad programming-related requests and then delegates them to a local CLI configured with `--permission-mode bypassPermissions`, which can perform filesystem modifications without interactive approval. This creates a real risk of unintended execution from ordinary user prompts, especially because the skill is user-invocable and designed to run shell commands against a local project directory.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.