T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:8- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 8
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml metadata: { "openclaw": { "emoji": "🧬", "requires": { "bins": ["python3"], "install": ["uv pip install biopython"] } } }Technical Analysis
The installation command resolves and installs
biopythonwithout an exact version constraint or an integrity hash. Consequently, the effective dependency can change after the Skill has been reviewed. Security and behavior depend on whichever package release the configured package index serves at installation time.This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current Biopython package is malicious. Exploitation would require the package distribution channel, package publisher account, resolver configuration, or selected future release to be compromised or otherwise untrusted.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the relevant package publication channel, publisher account, configured package index, or dependency-resolution environment.
- The attacker makes a malicious or compromised version of
biopythonavailable for resolution. - During Skill setup,
uv pip install biopythonselects that mutable version because no reviewed version or hash is enforced. - Package installation or a later
from Bio import Entrezimport executes attacker-controlled package code. - The payload operates with the privileges and environmental access of the user or Agent process performing the installation or running the Skill.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the installing or executing account. The resulting scope may include reading or modifying files accessible to that account, accessing environment variables and process credentials, making network requests, tampering with the Skill runtime, and affecting generated res ...[truncated 175 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Pin Biopython to a reviewed exact version rather than resolving the latest available release, for example:
yaml "install": ["uv pip install biopython==<reviewed-version>"] -
Generate and maintain a lockfile that records all transitive dependency versions.
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Enforce cryptographic hashes for downloaded distributions, such as through a requirements file used with
--require-hashes. -
Restrict installation to the expected authenticated package index and prevent untrusted index or mirror configuration.
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Prefer reviewed wheel artifacts and verify their provenance and integrity in CI before release.
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Run dependency installation and Skill execution in an isolated, least-privileged environment without unnecessary credentials or sensitive filesystem access.
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Add automated dependency vulnerability scanning and a controlled process for reviewing and updating pinned versions.
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