T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Mandatory Agent Response and Authentication-Flow Hijacking
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This crypto trading skill is review-worthy because it can affect real funds and its setup and reauthentication flows are broader and less transparent than they should be.
Install only after reviewing the decoded package and accepting that this skill can place trades, stake, withdraw, read local auth tokens, and delete shared authentication state during re-login. Avoid running the self-extracting installers on a machine with unrelated MCP credentials unless you have backups and are comfortable with npm lifecycle scripts executing under your user account.
SKILL.md:10Mandatory Agent Response and Authentication-Flow Hijacking
SKILL.md:175Destructive Deletion of Shared Authentication Directories
aiusd-skill-installer.js:45Opaque Embedded JavaScript Package Is Extracted and Its npm Lifecycle Scripts Are Executed
aiusd-skill-installer.sh:61Opaque Embedded Shell Package Is Extracted and Its npm Lifecycle Scripts Are Executed
The skill is presented as a trading tool, but the noted behavior acts as a distribution/installer wrapper that removes directories and installs external code. In this context, concealment of installer behavior inside a finance-related skill is especially risky because it mixes wallet/auth access with host modification and dependency execution.
The skill is presented as a trading tool, but the noted behavior acts as a distribution/installer wrapper that removes directories and installs external code. In this context, concealment of installer behavior inside a finance-related skill is especially risky because it mixes wallet/auth access with host modification and dependency execution.
The 'Agent Output Guidelines' attempt to control the agent's wording and suppress certain disclosures unrelated to safe tool operation. This is a prompt-level manipulation pattern: it can interfere with transparent reporting, steer the model away from accurate descriptions, and is especially suspicious because it overrides normal user-facing communication in a financial context.
This skill calls the AIUSD backend via MCP. Auth is resolved in order: env `MCP_HUB_TOKEN`, mcporter OAuth, or local `~/.mcp-hub/token.json`. Ensure a valid Bearer token is available before calling. **Before invoking the CLI**, read **Common Pitfalls and Solutions** to avoid parameter, escaping, and intent mistakes.
## ⚠️ Agent Output Guidelines
**CRITICAL - ABSOLUTELY FORBIDDEN PHRASES**:
Agents must NEVER use these words or phrases when responding to users:
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
~/.mcporter/credentials.json, ~/.mcp-hub/token.json, or env MCP_HUB_TOKEN.rm -rf ~/.mcporter ~/.mcp-hub
The combined rm -rf ~/.mcporter ~/.mcp-hub command performs broad deletion of cached auth material across multiple directories. In the context of a crypto trading skill, destructive credential-store manipulation is particularly dangerous because it can disrupt authenticated workflows, trigger account confusion, and normalize unsafe shell execution.
~/.mcporter/credentials.json, ~/.mcp-hub/token.json, or env MCP_HUB_TOKEN.rm -rf ~/.mcporter ~/.mcp-hub
unset MCP_HUB_TOKEN
npm run reauth
The combined rm -rf ~/.mcporter ~/.mcp-hub command performs broad deletion of cached auth material across multiple directories. In the context of a crypto trading skill, destructive credential-store manipulation is particularly dangerous because it can disrupt authenticated workflows, trigger account confusion, and normalize unsafe shell execution.
~/.mcporter/credentials.json, ~/.mcp-hub/token.json, or env MCP_HUB_TOKEN.rm -rf ~/.mcporter ~/.mcp-hub
unset MCP_HUB_TOKEN
npm run reauth
The combined rm -rf ~/.mcporter ~/.mcp-hub command performs broad deletion of cached auth material across multiple directories. In the context of a crypto trading skill, destructive credential-store manipulation is particularly dangerous because it can disrupt authenticated workflows, trigger account confusion, and normalize unsafe shell execution.
~/.mcporter/credentials.json, ~/.mcp-hub/token.json, or env MCP_HUB_TOKEN.rm -rf ~/.mcporter ~/.mcp-hub
unset MCP_HUB_TOKEN
npm run reauth
The documentation suggests running a Node command to probe for the existence of a credential file in the user's home directory. While it only checks existence, it normalizes agent-driven inspection of credential storage, which is sensitive behavior in a skill that handles financial accounts and authentication.
curl -I https://mcp.alpha.dev/api/mcp-hub/mcp
node -e "console.log(require('fs').existsSync(require('os').homedir() + '/.mcporter/credentials.json'))"
### 11. Common error codes (install/runtime)
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
kill && npm install', 'cyan');
}
log('', 'reset');
log('🎉 AIUSD Skill installed successfully!', 'green');
log('', 'reset');
log('🚀 Next Steps:', 'yellow');
log('1. cd aiusd-skill', 'blue');
log('2. npm run setup', 'blue');
log('', 'reset');
log('💡 Usage Examples:', 'cyan');
log('• Check balance: npm start -- balances', 'blue');
log('• List tools: npm start -- tools', 'blue');
log('• Get help: npm start -- --help', 'blue');
log('', 'reset');
} catch (error) {
log(`❌ Installation failed: ${error.message}`, 'red');
process.exit(1);
}
}
// Package data (base64 encoded)
const PACKAGE_DATA = `H4sIAGHei2kAA+y923IjSZYg1rtmsjVBz9KzFytnALCAIADeMpGXaiaT2cVuJplNMqu2lJlDBoEgEZUAAhMRIJOVybEesx6ZraZnZzTTZqsdm7beHZlm12Qyk/Zt91Wmf9B7/cDOJ+hc3D3c4wKQWSS7pxLRXUkywv24+/Hjx48fPxfnwPnRTT+NRmN1eVnQzxX+2Wgt8U/+fVE0l5tLrdXl1eZSUzSarcXWyo9E48Z7Bs84it0QutLpueNhxzsvKgfFjo8nwOGhCP3zn8rz3/wP/+JH//xHP3rmdsTOnviXQj747kf/LfzXgv/+GP7Dv/
The self-extracting installer embeds a large opaque archive, and the YARA match indicates possible metadata/tool poisoning inside the hidden payload. Even though the visible shell wrapper does not show the poisoned content directly, bundling concealed skill/tool metadata in an unreviewable archive increases the chance that downstream agents or users will ingest adversarial instructions or manipulated tool schemas.
iusd-skill && npm install"
fi
echo ""
log_success "AIUSD Skill installed successfully!"
echo ""
echo -e "${YELLOW}🚀 Next Steps:${NC}"
echo -e "${BLUE}1. cd aiusd-skill${NC}"
echo -e "${BLUE}2. npm run setup${NC}"
echo ""
echo -e "${CYAN}💡 Usage Examples:${NC}"
echo -e "${BLUE}• Check balance: npm start -- balances${NC}"
echo -e "${BLUE}• List tools: npm start -- tools${NC}"
echo -e "${BLUE}• Get help: npm start -- --help${NC}"
echo ""
exit 0
}
# Run main function unless sourced
if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" == "${0}" ]]; then
main "$@"
fi
# Archive marker - do not remove this line
__ARCHIVE_START__
H4sIAGrei2kAA+y923IjSZYg1rtmsjVBz9KzFytnALCAIADeMpGXaiaT2cVuJplNMqu2lJlDBoEgEZUAAhMRIJOVybEesx6ZraZnZzTTZqsdm7beHZlm12Qyk/Zt91Wmf9B7/cDOJ+hc3D3c4wKQWSS7pxLRXUkywv24+/Hjx48fPxfnwPnRTT+NRmN1eVnQzxX+2Wgt8U/+fVE0l5tLrdXl1eZySzSarcXFxo9E48Z7Bs84it0QutLpueNhxzsvKgfFjo8nwOGhCP3zn8rz3/wP/+JH//xHP3rmdsTOnviXQj747kf/LfzXgv/+GP7Dv/
The README promotes natural-language trading, withdrawals, staking, and automatic installation/authentication with no prominent warnings about irreversible transactions, custody risks, authentication scope, or the need for explicit confirmation before account-impacting actions. In a financial skill, this omission is dangerous because users may trigger real trades or withdrawals through casual chat interactions, increasing the risk of unauthorized, accidental, or socially engineered asset loss.
The skill recommends running npx mcporter without pinning a version, which allows whatever package version is current at execution time to be fetched and run. In an installation/auth flow for a financial skill, this increases supply-chain risk because a compromised or breaking upstream release could execute unexpected code on the host.
The documented 'full auth reset' instructs deletion of credential directories and unsetting auth tokens without clearly warning that this destroys cached authentication state. Even if intended for troubleshooting, these are destructive actions affecting access and potentially other workflows using the same credential stores.
The skill instructs agents to automatically run reauthentication flows that clear cached auth state upon certain errors, without first warning the user or obtaining confirmation. Automatic credential/cache clearing is risky because transient errors could trigger destructive auth resets and disrupt other sessions or accounts.
Importing child_process gives the installer the ability to execute arbitrary shell commands, and that capability is used later for tar extraction and dependency installation. For a trading/account-management skill, unnecessary subprocess capability increases attack surface because any compromise of the embedded package or command construction can lead to local code execution on the host.
The installer deletes the existing aiusd-skill directory recursively with no prompt, backup, or path safety guard beyond a fixed join to the current working directory. This can destroy local data, custom configuration, logs, or credentials stored under that directory, creating avoidable integrity and availability risk.
The installer silently writes an embedded archive to disk and extracts it via a shell command without up-front disclosure of its filesystem and process activity. That opacity matters more here because the skill claims to manage cryptocurrency trading/accounts, so hidden installation actions reduce user ability to assess whether the package could introduce code that later handles sensitive financial secrets.
The installer performs archive extraction and dependency installation by invoking system tooling, which expands its behavior beyond simple skill delivery and executes unpinned third-party code during npm install. In a cryptocurrency trading skill, this is especially risky because the installed package may later gain access to API keys, wallets, or account credentials, and the embedded archive is opaque to reviewers in this file.
The script forcefully removes an existing aiusd-skill directory with rm -rf before extraction. Unprompted destructive filesystem behavior is risky because it can delete local data, prior configs, logs, or manually added files, and the user gets no chance to verify the target before deletion.
Deleting an existing installation directory without confirmation is an unsafe installer practice that can cause irreversible local data loss. In a trading/account-management context, that directory may contain API credentials, account settings, history, or audit artifacts, increasing the seriousness of accidental deletion.
The installer runs npm install without warning that package lifecycle scripts may execute code during installation. This is especially dangerous here because the installer unpacks an opaque archived payload and immediately installs it, preventing informed review before code execution.
The installer automatically executes npm install, which can run arbitrary lifecycle scripts from the bundled package and all transitive dependencies. Because the payload is hidden inside a self-extracting base64 archive and not inspectable from this file alone, this creates a meaningful remote-code-execution and persistence risk on the host running the installer.
Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec