T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:15- Finding
Excessive Full Disk Access for Processing Sensitive WhatsApp Data
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill appears purpose-aligned, but it asks users to run an unpinned third-party binary with Full Disk Access and to duplicate private WhatsApp chats into a persistent local archive.
Review this before installing. Only run it if you are comfortable granting Full Disk Access to the terminal and creating a second local database of your WhatsApp history. Prefer a pinned or auditable wacrawl release, protect ~/.wacrawl with strict local permissions, consider whether backups will capture the archive, and remove both the archive and any schedule when you no longer need it.
SKILL.md:15Excessive Full Disk Access for Processing Sensitive WhatsApp Data
SKILL.md:5Unpinned Privileged Binary Installed from a Third-Party Homebrew Tap
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
Local read-only mirror of WhatsApp Desktop on macOS. Copies WhatsApp's SQLite databases into a temp snapshot, imports useful chat data into its own archive, and exposes scriptable search.
**Does not** send messages, decrypt cloud backups, talk to WhatsApp Web, or write back into WhatsApp's app container.
## Requirements
- macOS with **WhatsApp Desktop** (Mac App Store version) installed and signed in.
The skill clearly states that wacrawl import copies WhatsApp SQLite data into ~/.wacrawl/wacrawl.db, but it does not present this as an explicit privacy warning or emphasize that highly sensitive message content is being duplicated into a second persistent archive. This increases the risk that a user enables full-disk access and runs the import without fully understanding the creation of an additional local datastore containing private chats, attachments metadata, and searchable history.
No suspicious patterns detected.