Argocd Deployment Analyzer

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 7:30 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

This skill is a coherent ArgoCD/Kubernetes diagnostic guide, with expected read-heavy access and one temp-file handling issue users should harden before using on sensitive manifests.

Installers should treat this as a read-only operational audit skill. Before using it, confirm the agent has only the ArgoCD/Kubernetes permissions needed for the requested app or project, avoid all-cluster scans unless intended, and replace the fixed /tmp manifest output examples with secure temporary files and cleanup.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:211
• Finding: Predictable Temporary Files Expose Manifests to Disclosure and Symlink-Based File Clobbering## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 211–213 **Vulnerability Type**: Predictable and insecure temporary-file handling **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash # Extract rendered manifests argocd app manifests <app-name> --source live > /tmp/live-manifests.yaml argocd app manifests <app-name> --source git > /tmp/git-manifests.yaml ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented commands write rendered Kubernetes manifests to fixed paths in the shared `/tmp` directory. They do not securely create the files, restrict their permissions, verify that the destinations are regular files, or remove them after use. Shell output redirection opens the destination with truncation and ordinarily follows symbolic links. A local attacker able to create files in `/tmp` can therefore pre-create `/tmp/live-manifests.yaml` or `/tmp/git-manifests.yaml` as a symbolic link to another file writable by the account running the Skill. When the command executes, the linked file may be truncated and replaced with manifest data. Rendered manifests may contain Kubernetes `Secret` objects, environment variables, internal service addresses, repository details, security settings, or other operationally sensitive configuration. Depending on the process umask and local environment, fixed output files may also be readable by other users and remain available after the analysis ends. ### Attack Path 1. A local attacker predicts the fixed temporary path, such as `/tmp/live-manifests.yaml`. 2. Before the analysis runs, the attacker creates that path as a symbolic link to a file writable by the Skill's operating-system account. 3. The operator follows the Skill instructions and runs the manifest extraction command. 4. Shell redirection follows the symbolic link and truncates or overwrites the linked target with rendered Kubernetes manifests. 5. Alternatively, if the resulting temporary file has permissive permis ...[truncated 1015 chars]
• Remediation: ## Remediation Suggestions - Create a private temporary directory with `mktemp -d` rather than using predictable filenames. - Set `umask 077` before creating files so only the current operating-system user can access them. - Register a cleanup trap to remove the directory and its contents on normal exit, interruption, or failure. - Avoid storing rendered manifests when possible; stream command output directly into the required analysis tool. - Run the analysis under a dedicated, least-privileged account and avoid running it as `root`. - Treat all rendered manifests as sensitive because they may include Secret resources or credentials. - If files must be retained, use a protected directory with explicit ownership and mode `0600`, and establish a defined retention policy. Example hardened pattern: ```bash umask 077 tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)" || exit 1 trap 'rm -rf -- "$tmpdir"' EXIT HUP INT TERM argocd app manifests "$app_name" --source live > "$tmpdir/live-manifests.yaml" argocd app manifests "$app_name" --source git > "$tmpdir/git-manifests.yaml" ```

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (1)

Privileged Kubernetes Workload

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

**Security checks:**

- Containers running as root or with `privileged: true`
- Missing SecurityContext, `readOnlyRootFilesystem`, `runAsNonRoot`
- Missing resource limits (CPU/memory) — noisy neighbor risk
- `hostNetwork`, `hostPID`, `hostIPC` enabled

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.