T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:77
- Finding
- Unpinned External Source Retrieval and Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:77-83`; `scripts/ao.sh:3-5` **Vulnerability Type**: Execution of mutable, externally maintained source code without revision or integrity verification **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code `SKILL.md:77-83`: ```bash Update from source with: ```bash cd /Users/ShiXin/Documents/Workspace/github-project/agent-orchestrator git pull --ff-only pnpm install pnpm -r build ``` ``` `scripts/ao.sh:3-5`: ```bash PROJECT_DIR="/Users/ShiXin/Documents/Workspace/github-project/agent-orchestrator" cd "$PROJECT_DIR" exec node packages/ao/bin/ao.js "$@" ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented maintenance procedure retrieves the latest content from a configured Git remote and subsequently installs dependencies and executes build scripts. It does not pin the external Agent Orchestrator repository to a reviewed commit or verify the repository origin, commit signature, or expected content hash. Both `pnpm install` and `pnpm -r build` can execute package lifecycle or build scripts supplied by the retrieved project and its dependencies. The wrapper then directly executes `packages/ao/bin/ao.js` from this mutable checkout. Consequently, the effective executable payload may change after the Skill itself has been reviewed. The use of `--ff-only` prevents non-fast-forward merges but does not establish trust in the fetched commits. It does not protect against a compromised upstream repository, malicious changes pushed to an authorized branch, a manipulated local Git remote, or compromised dependency sources. The wrapper correctly quotes `PROJECT_DIR` and forwards arguments using `"$@"`; no direct shell argument-injection vulnerability was identified in the wrapper itself. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the configured Agent Orchestrator upstream repository, an authorized publishing account, a dependency source, or the local checkout and its Git remote conf ...[truncated 1443 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin Agent Orchestrator to an explicitly approved commit hash or signed release rather than automatically executing the latest branch state. 2. Verify that the Git remote URL matches an allowlisted repository before fetching or executing updates. 3. Require cryptographic verification of signed commits, signed tags, or release artifacts. 4. Compare the checked-out commit against an approved revision before every invocation of `scripts/ao.sh`. 5. Commit and review a dependency lockfile, then use `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` to prevent unreviewed dependency resolution changes. 6. Audit package lifecycle scripts and consider installing with scripts disabled where operationally possible. 7. Require explicit user confirmation before source updates, dependency installation, or build-script execution. 8. Run update and build operations in a sandbox or minimally privileged environment with restricted filesystem, credential, and network access. 9. Prefer bundling a reviewed executable version with the Skill when licensing and deployment constraints permit it. 10. Fail closed if repository origin, revision, signature, lockfile integrity, or expected source hashes cannot be verified.