T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:89- Finding
Delegated Agents Are Granted Unrestricted Automatic Permissions
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent ACP delegation guide, but it asks users to grant broad automatic authority to external agents and exposes API-key handling risks.
Install only if you are comfortable reviewing and tightening the acpx configuration yourself. Prefer read-only or per-task approvals, avoid printing API keys, protect or avoid plaintext credential files, pin harness package versions, and run delegated agents in a restricted workspace when possible.
SKILL.md:89Delegated Agents Are Granted Unrestricted Automatic Permissions
SKILL.md:61Authentication Troubleshooting Prints the Complete API Key
references/harness-list.md:5Third-Party Agent Packages Are Downloaded and Executed Without Immutable Version Pinning
The skill explicitly instructs setting defaultPermissions to approve-all, which disables interactive safety checks for all acpx operations in automated use. In a delegation skill that can spawn external harnesses and execute tasks on behalf of a coordinator, this materially increases the chance of unauthorized file access, command execution, or dangerous tool actions without user review.
The recommended configuration combines defaultPermissions: "approve-all" with authPolicy: "skip", effectively removing interactive approval and authentication safeguards for delegated agents. In this skill's context—delegating actions to external ACP-enabled harnesses—this materially increases the chance of unauthorized file modification, command execution, or other unintended actions if the harness, prompt chain, or upstream package is compromised.
The skill tells users to place ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in environment variables or a persistent config file but does not warn about secret handling risks such as shell history exposure, file permission issues, accidental logging, or committing config files. Because this skill is specifically about delegating to external runtimes, mishandled credentials could enable unauthorized access to paid model APIs or downstream agent actions.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
## 相关文件
- Skill 配置:`~/.openclaw/skills/acp-harness-delegation/SKILL.md`
- Harness 列表:`~/.openclaw/skills/acp-harness-delegation/references/harness-list.md`
- acpx 全局配置:`~/.acpx/config.json`
- Claude API Key 配置:`~/.acpx/config.json` 的 `authCredentials` 字段
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx -y opencode-ai acp invokes a package without any version constraint, which allows the latest published package to be fetched and executed at runtime. In an automation/delegation skill, this increases supply-chain risk because a compromised or malicious upstream release could be executed with the user's local permissions.
The document explicitly recommends storing ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in ~/.acpx/config.json in plaintext without warning about file permissions, secret-management alternatives, or exposure risks. Plaintext local credential storage can lead to token disclosure through backups, accidental commits, overly broad filesystem access, or local compromise.