T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:22- Finding
Unverified Remote Archive Installed as an Executable Python Package
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 22–31
Vulnerability Type: Unverified third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown - SaaS installation guide or same-domain download: `https://ai.gaobobo.cn/downloads/social-auto-upload.zip` - Extract it to a fixed directory (example: `C:\Users\birds\Desktop\local\social-auto-upload-main`) ### 2. Install CLI In the extracted directory: ```bash uv pip install -e . # Without uv: pip install -e .text The source document is written partly in Chinese; the snippet above is an accurate English rendering of the affected instructions. ### Technical Analysis The historical workflow instructs the user to download a mutable ZIP archive from a remote server and install its contents as an editable Python package. It provides no immutable version, cryptographic checksum, digital signature, or other mechanism for authenticating the archive. Python package installation may execute attacker-controlled build backend or packaging code. Therefore, compromise of the download server, its deployment pipeline, DNS/TLS trust chain, or the hosted archive could convert this installation step into arbitrary local code execution. The document prominently marks the skill as deprecated and tells users not to execute the historical workflow. This reduces the likelihood of exploitation but does not eliminate the risk because the executable instructions and download location remain present. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the archive, hosting server, or release pipeline associated with the documented URL. 2. The attacker replaces the ZIP with a modified Python project containing malicious packaging or build-system logic. 3. A user or agent follows the retained historical instructions and downloads and extracts the archive. 4. The user runs `uv pip install -e .` or `pip install -e .`. 5. The Python installation process invokes the attacker-controlled build or p ...[truncated 638 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the obsolete installation and execution instructions because the skill is explicitly deprecated.
- If the archive must remain available, publish immutable, versioned release artifacts rather than a mutable generic ZIP path.
- Publish a SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic digest through an independently protected channel and require verification before extraction or installation.
- Digitally sign release artifacts and document mandatory signer and signature verification.
- Avoid editable installation for distributed releases. Prefer a signed, pinned wheel or another reproducible artifact.
- Pin all transitive dependencies and use hash-locked dependency files.
- Perform installation in an isolated, least-privileged environment after reviewing the package manifest and build configuration.
- Ensure documentation causes verification failure to stop installation rather than treating verification as optional.
