Back to skill

Security audit

标准操作程序生成

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent SOP-writing helper with limited file-output behavior, but users should notice its default saved files and built-in attribution text.

Before installing, be aware that the skill may create SOP Markdown files and, when worksheet templates are requested, copy a spreadsheet template into the output area. Review generated SOPs before sharing them, especially if you do not want the built-in book/framework or OPC-AI attribution included.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:61
Finding
Mandatory Promotional Content Injection into Generated SOP Documents<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 61 and 156 **Vulnerability Type**: Mandatory output manipulation through Skill instructions **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code Snippet The following is an English rendering of the relevant directives: ```markdown > Based on the Chapter 7 framework of "AI Super Individual: A Wealth-Creation Handbook for One-Person Companies" ... > This SOP was generated by OPC-AI Skill (sop-generator), based on the "AI Super Individual" manuscript framework. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill's fixed output template requires generated SOP documents to contain attribution and promotional references to “OPC-AI” and the book or manuscript titled “AI Super Individual.” These directives affect the agent's final response regardless of whether the user requested such attribution. Because the injected content is embedded in the Skill instructions, it is automatically introduced when the agent follows the prescribed SOP template. This alters the expected output of the current session and causes attacker- or author-controlled messaging to appear in user documents. This behavior best matches **T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking** because the Skill text changes the agent's output goals by requiring unrelated promotional content. No evidence was found that these instructions disable safety controls, obtain elevated system privileges, execute code, or establish persistence. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the Skill by requesting generation or standardization of an SOP. 2. The agent loads and follows the instructions in `SKILL.md`. 3. The agent uses the mandatory output template defined by the Skill. 4. The template inserts references to “OPC-AI” and “AI Super Individual” into the generated document. 5. The user may save, distribute, or publish the generated SOP without realizing that promotional attribution was imposed by the Skill. ### Impact Assessment The vulnerability does not provide operating-sy ...[truncated 678 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove mandatory references to “OPC-AI,” the book, and the manuscript from the default SOP template. 2. Keep the generated output focused exclusively on content requested by the user. 3. If attribution is legitimately required, make it explicitly optional and obtain user consent before adding it. 4. Add a configuration option such as `include_attribution: false`, with attribution disabled by default. 5. Clearly distinguish optional attribution from operational SOP content so that it cannot be mistaken for user-authored material. 6. Review all fixed templates and default prompts for other author-controlled branding, endorsements, links, or messages unrelated to the user's task. 7. Add a validation step that compares generated output against the user's request and flags unsolicited promotional content before saving the document. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The top-level description is broad enough that normal requests about workflow documentation or SOP writing may trigger the skill even when the user did not intend file-generating or automation-oriented behavior. Over-broad matching can cause inappropriate skill activation and amplify the undisclosed side effects elsewhere in the file.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The trigger list uses common phrases like '生成SOP', '流程标准化', and '流程文档' without scope constraints or confirmation gates. This can cause the skill to activate on broad productivity requests and then proceed into default file-writing behavior, making accidental invocation more likely.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill claims to generate SOP content, but it also directs the agent to write a Markdown file by default. This creates an undeclared side effect: content generation becomes filesystem modification, which can surprise users and lead to unintended file creation or overwriting in the agent's output area.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill says it will save the SOP as `SOP_{流程名称}.md` by default, but it does not warn the user that invoking the skill creates a file or explain where it will be written. Silent file creation is risky because it can overwrite existing files, leak sensitive workflow information into persistent storage, or violate user expectations about a chat-only operation.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The documentation instructs copying a spreadsheet asset into an output directory and modifying workbook-based content, but this behavior is not reflected in the skill description. Hidden asset duplication expands the skill from text assistance to file operations, increasing the risk of unexpected file creation, storage clutter, or accidental propagation of stale/problematic templates.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The asset-copy instructions describe creating copied spreadsheet files in the output directory without notifying the user of the side effect. Even if the impact is limited, unannounced duplication can create confusion, proliferate files, and expose operational data in persistent artifacts.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The natural-language string in the manifest hard-codes an English invocation phrase ('Use $sop-generator to turn my recurring work into a clear, testable SOP.') even though the skill metadata is otherwise in Chinese. This can violate language/locale policy because it imposes a specific language without offering the user a choice or documenting a justified locale constraint.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.