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Security audit

内容矩阵规划

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Chinese-language content-planning helper with some user-control concerns around default file saving and fixed report attribution, but no evidence of malicious behavior.

Before installing, expect the skill to ask for business and account-planning details and to create a local Markdown report. Review the saved file for sensitive information and remove the fixed attribution if it is not appropriate for your use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:169
Finding
Mandatory Branded Attribution in Generated Reports## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 169 **Vulnerability Type**: `T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking` **Risk Level**: High **Complete Code Snippet**: ```markdown > This report was generated by the OPC-AI Skill (content-planner), based on the framework from the book "AI Super Individual." ``` The snippet above is an English rendering of the mandatory attribution instruction at the identified location. ### Technical Analysis The fixed attribution appears inside the Skill's output template. When the Skill is invoked and the agent follows that template, the instruction causes every generated report to contain promotional attribution for the Skill and the referenced book, even when the user did not request or approve such branding. This is instruction-level output manipulation because loading the Skill alters the expected deliverable by introducing content unrelated to the substantive content-planning task. The behavior does not involve executable code, credential access, external communication, or modification of system security controls. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the `content-planner` Skill to produce a content-planning report. 2. The agent loads and follows the output template in `SKILL.md`. 3. The mandatory attribution at line 169 is copied into the generated report. 4. The user may publish, distribute, or provide the report to clients without noticing that it contains unsolicited promotional attribution. 5. The Skill and referenced publication consequently receive an implied endorsement through the user's deliverable. ### Impact Assessment The issue affects the integrity and user control of generated reports. It can introduce unsolicited branding, imply endorsement, and create reputational or contractual concerns when reports are used as professional deliverables. The exploitation scope is limited to agent-generated output produced through this Skill. It grants no operating-system ...[truncated 141 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the fixed attribution from the default output template. 2. If attribution is operationally required, expose it as an explicit opt-in setting that is disabled by default. 3. Ask for informed user consent before adding third-party names, product branding, book references, promotional statements, or endorsements to a deliverable. 4. Keep the default template limited to content directly necessary for the user's requested report. 5. Add a template review check that flags fixed promotional text and other content not derived from the user's request. 6. Test the revised Skill by generating a report without enabling attribution and verifying that no branding is inserted.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The manifest description and instruction content are entirely in Chinese and position the assistant as operating in that language, but do not state that this is a China-specific or Chinese-only skill. Without user opt-in or an explicit locale justification, this can violate language/locale policy expectations.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The trigger list includes generic phrases like '内容策略' and '怎么运营账号', which can match normal conversation and cause the skill to activate when the user did not explicitly request it. This is primarily a safety and reliability issue: unintended activation can steer the conversation, collect unnecessary business information, or initiate file-generation behavior without clear user intent.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to write a Markdown file by default without explicit user confirmation or notice. Any automatic file write is a boundary-crossing action: it can create unwanted artifacts, overwrite expected workflows, or persist potentially sensitive business planning details to disk without the user's informed consent.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill metadata on L2-L3 is entirely in Chinese, but L4 hard-codes an English default prompt. This creates a language-policy mismatch and may force interaction in a specific language without offering the user a choice or explaining the locale requirement.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.